CAJ | 학술논문

土地政策在宏观调控中的地位凸显,但常在执行环节上遭遇地方政府失责的困境。分析中央政府和地方政府在土地政策传导过程的委托代理关系和效用函数,引入失责补偿转移变量,对霍姆斯特姆和米尔格罗姆简化模型进行局部改进,建立基于中央政府土地调控偏好并满足地方政府正当利益诉求的优化模型,形成土地调控中对地方政府线性问责机制,结果表明：地方政府失责行为影响的扩大,会加大其失责风险成本。压缩地方政府土地失责行为的收益空间,提高中央对地方的土地监察查处力度,促使地方政府收敛其失责行为。
토지정책재굉관조공중적지위철현,단상재집행배절상조우지방정부실책적곤경。분석중앙정부화지방정부재토지정책전도과정적위탁대리관계화효용함수,인입실책보상전이변량,대곽모사특모화미이격라모간화모형진행국부개진,건립기우중앙정부토지조공편호병만족지방정부정당이익소구적우화모형,형성토지조공중대지방정부선성문책궤제,결과표명：지방정부실책행위영향적확대,회가대기실책풍험성본。압축지방정부토지실책행위적수익공간,제고중앙대지방적토지감찰사처력도,촉사지방정부수렴기실책행위。
Land policy has a prominent position in the macro-control,but often encounters the plight of the local government default during the implementing.This article explains the main reason and behavior of the local government default,and analysis the principal-agent relationships and utility functions of the central and local governments in land policy transmission process by information economics.Then through the introduction of the transfer variable of the default compensation,Holmstrom and Milgrom simplified model has been partially improved,the optimization model is established based on the land macro-control preferences of central government and the demands of the legitimate interests of local governments,and the linear accountability system for local government in Land macro-control is drawn.The results show that：the local government to expand the impact of default will increase its default risk costs,and enhance the investigation and penalty of the central government for the local government default so as to promote the local government to soften its default behavior.