CAJ | 학술논문

在中国式的财政分权体制下,地方政府在政治晋升激励的驱动下,为GDP增长而会实施＂打到底线的竞争＂。这种过度竞争导致了地方公共品尤其是教育、环境、医疗和社会保障等非生产性公共品的提供不足。本文构建了一个财政分权的理论模型,考察了不同的政府目标下,地方政府公共品提供是否会导致福利损失。我们发现,当政府目标是最大化居民的效用时,政府间的竞争会导致公共品提供不足。在只考虑非生产性公共品的模型中,当地方政府的目标更加偏向GDP的增长时,公共品提供不足会更加严重。当政府公共支出划分为生产性和非生产性公共品这两类时,地方政府越偏向于本地GDP的增长,非生产性公共品的提供会更加不足,生产性公共品的提供则可能会过量。
재중국식적재정분권체제하,지방정부재정치진승격려적구동하,위GDP증장이회실시＂타도저선적경쟁＂。저충과도경쟁도치료지방공공품우기시교육、배경、의료화사회보장등비생산성공공품적제공불족。본문구건료일개재정분권적이론모형,고찰료불동적정부목표하,지방정부공공품제공시부회도치복리손실。아문발현,당정부목표시최대화거민적효용시,정부간적경쟁회도치공공품제공불족。재지고필비생산성공공품적모형중,당지방정부적목표경가편향GDP적증장시,공공품제공불족회경가엄중。당정부공공지출화분위생산성화비생산성공공품저량류시,지방정부월편향우본지GDP적증장,비생산성공공품적제공회경가불족,생산성공공품적제공칙가능회과량。
Under China’s fiscal decentralization system, local officials are encouraged to join in the ＂race to the bottom＂ competition by the promotion incentive.This type of competition causes underprovision of local public goods, especially education, health, environment protection and social security etc.This paper builds a fiscal decentralization model to investigate local public goods provision under different government goals.We find that, when the government’s goal is to maximize residents’ utility, competition among local government will make local public goods underprovided.When local government is more prone to GDP growth, the underprovision is more sever.We also explore the case when public goods can be classified into productive and non-productive goods, and find that under some conditions, productive public goods will be underprovided, while non-productive goods will be overprovided.