CAJ | 학술논문

本文对委托人、监督者和代理人的主体进行重新界定,并对无合谋防御机制时的情形作了分析,再针对合谋行为设计出监督者主导和委托人主导两种合谋防御机制。在监督者主导的防御机制中,委托人事前给出一组契约,授权监督者向代理人提供子契约,委托人提供的契约可使得监督者和代理人所得到的转移支付都不小于其实施合谋时的信息租金,让监督者和代理人没有激励进行合谋。在委托人主导型的防御机制中,委托人同时与监督者和代理人签订契约,如代理人谎报自己的成本类型,委托人会对代理人实施罚金,而给予监督者奖励,让监督者有动力积极履行职责,且能激励高成本类型的代理人降低生产成本。
본문대위탁인、감독자화대리인적주체진행중신계정,병대무합모방어궤제시적정형작료분석,재침대합모행위설계출감독자주도화위탁인주도량충합모방어궤제。재감독자주도적방어궤제중,위탁인사전급출일조계약,수권감독자향대리인제공자계약,위탁인제공적계약가사득감독자화대리인소득도적전이지부도불소우기실시합모시적신식조금,양감독자화대리인몰유격려진행합모。재위탁인주도형적방어궤제중,위탁인동시여감독자화대리인첨정계약,여대리인황보자기적성본류형,위탁인회대대리인실시벌금,이급여감독자장려,양감독자유동력적겁리행직책,차능격려고성본류형적대리인강저생산성본。
In this paper,we redefine that who are principal,supervisor and agent.We also analyze the situation without collusion-proof mechanism,and design two collusion proof mechanisms.One is dominated by supervisor and the other by principal.In the anterior mechanism,principal provides a contract beforehand,and authorizes supervisor to contract with agent.Principal can make the transfer payoffs to supervisor and agent more than the information rents produced by collusion.It will give supervisor no incentive to participate collusion.In the later one,principal contracts with supervisor and agent at the same time.If agent lies about his cost type,principal will punish agent,and give additional premiums to supervisor.Then supervisor will have incentives to execute supervision,and high cost agent also will have incentives to reduce the production cost.