CAJ | 학술논문

本文从社会平等的角度给出了一个对中国经济增长的政治经济学解释。本文的理论模型表明，平等的社会结构使得政府选择成为一个中性政府，即在社会群体之间没有特定长期偏好的政府，这样的政府更可能把资源分配给生产力比较高的社会群体，从而促进经济增长。得益于中国革命所带来的平等的社会结构，以及改革开放初期党的工作重点向经济建设的转移，中国政府在过去三十多年是一个中性政府，采纳了有利于经济长期发展的政策。但同时，政府把有限的资源分配给生产力较高的群体或地区，必然会扩大收入差距。
본문종사회평등적각도급출료일개대중국경제증장적정치경제학해석。본문적이론모형표명，평등적사회결구사득정부선택성위일개중성정부，즉재사회군체지간몰유특정장기편호적정부，저양적정부경가능파자원분배급생산력비교고적사회군체，종이촉진경제증장。득익우중국혁명소대래적평등적사회결구，이급개혁개방초기당적공작중점향경제건설적전이，중국정부재과거삼십다년시일개중성정부，채납료유리우경제장기발전적정책。단동시，정부파유한적자원분배급생산력교고적군체혹지구，필연회확대수입차거。
This paper aims at providing a political economic explanation for China＇ s economic ascent from the perspective of social equality. Our key idea is that the equal social structure in China has led to the emergence of the disinterested government, i. e. , a government that does not have consistent interests in any social groups, and such a government is more likely than a biased government to allocate resources to groups with higher productivity and thus promote economic growth. This explanation is presented in a repeated Stackleherg model analyzing the relationship between social equality and government policies in autocracies. Based on the results of the model, we provide evidence for disinterestedness of the Chinese government. In particular, we analyze several selective government policies that treat social groups differently and thus enlarge income disparities, but promote economic growth.