管理学报
管理學報
관이학보
Chinese JOurnal of Management
2011年
2期
233~240
,共null页
网上创新竞争 作弊 信任 监督水平 威客
網上創新競爭 作弊 信任 鑑督水平 威客
망상창신경쟁 작폐 신임 감독수평 위객
online innovation contest; fraud; trust; detection effort; witkey
困扰网上创新竞争发展的一个重要因素是发布者作弊问题,它降低了解答者对发布者的信任,网络平台也采取各种方法监督作弊行为。为此,研究2个紧密关联的问题:①影响解答者对发布者信任的因素;②网络平台如何设定合适的监督水平。对问题①,基于信任理论构建研究模型,通过大样本问卷调研检验假设,结果表明:现有的信誉机制作用不显著,而网络平台本身的信誉和解答者满意度对信任有显著影响。实证研究结果凸显了网络平台服务水平的重要性,也是研究问题②的驱动因素。问题②的研究方法是博弈论,通过逆向求解,分析网络平台如何平衡成本和信誉来制定监督水平。最后,给出了主要结论以及未来的研究方向。
睏擾網上創新競爭髮展的一箇重要因素是髮佈者作弊問題,它降低瞭解答者對髮佈者的信任,網絡平檯也採取各種方法鑑督作弊行為。為此,研究2箇緊密關聯的問題:①影響解答者對髮佈者信任的因素;②網絡平檯如何設定閤適的鑑督水平。對問題①,基于信任理論構建研究模型,通過大樣本問捲調研檢驗假設,結果錶明:現有的信譽機製作用不顯著,而網絡平檯本身的信譽和解答者滿意度對信任有顯著影響。實證研究結果凸顯瞭網絡平檯服務水平的重要性,也是研究問題②的驅動因素。問題②的研究方法是博弈論,通過逆嚮求解,分析網絡平檯如何平衡成本和信譽來製定鑑督水平。最後,給齣瞭主要結論以及未來的研究方嚮。
곤우망상창신경쟁발전적일개중요인소시발포자작폐문제,타강저료해답자대발포자적신임,망락평태야채취각충방법감독작폐행위。위차,연구2개긴밀관련적문제:①영향해답자대발포자신임적인소;②망락평태여하설정합괄적감독수평。대문제①,기우신임이론구건연구모형,통과대양본문권조연검험가설,결과표명:현유적신예궤제작용불현저,이망락평태본신적신예화해답자만의도대신임유현저영향。실증연구결과철현료망락평태복무수평적중요성,야시연구문제②적구동인소。문제②적연구방법시박혁론,통과역향구해,분석망락평태여하평형성본화신예래제정감독수평。최후,급출료주요결론이급미래적연구방향。
Online innovation contest is a new effective way for open innovation.The sponsor,either corporate or individual,can submit contest problems online to seek solutions from a variety of solvers,and the solver who submits the best solution will get the award set by the sponsor.This new electronic commerce model is gaining more and more attention from researchers and practitioners.One of the serious problems in online innovation contest is sponsor's fraud behavior by registering two accounts in the same online contest platform and choosing himself as the winner while adopting solutions submitted by other solvers.Trust for sponsor which is critical factor influencing users' behavior is reduced by sponsors' fraud.This paper aimed to study: i) the antecedents of solvers' trust in sponsor;ii) how contest platform set the optimal fraud detection effort.For the first issue,a research model based on trust theory is constructed,and a survey was undertaken to test the model.The research results indicate that the current reputation mechanism to foster trust does not influence solvers' trust significantly,and the online platform's credibility and the solvers' satisfaction of past experience are vital to trust.The results from survey highlighted the importance of the online innovation contest platform service quality.For question two,a game theory model is constructed,and the optimal fraud detection effort balancing the reputation cost and detection cost is obtained with backward induction method.Implications and research extensions are identified to guide further research in this area.