CAJ | 학술논문

以在控制权私利驱动下公司的非效率投资为研究对象,考察了增长期权对控股股东的非效率投资决策和公司价值的影响,并分析了产生影响的内在机理.研究表明,存在控股股东的公司会产生投资不足行为,但当公司拥有增长期权时,由于控股股东偏好控制权私利的可持续性,增长期权能够减轻投资不足程度,使得控股股东的投资决策与公司价值最大化目标更加一致,显示出增长具有激励作用.同时,投资不足程度会随着,增长因子的增大和控股股东所占股份增加,而得到更快、更明显的缓解,而且在此过程中公司价值将会上升.
이재공제권사리구동하공사적비효솔투자위연구대상,고찰료증장기권대공고고동적비효솔투자결책화공사개치적영향,병분석료산생영향적내재궤리.연구표명,존재공고고동적공사회산생투자불족행위,단당공사옹유증장기권시,유우공고고동편호공제권사리적가지속성,증장기권능구감경투자불족정도,사득공고고동적투자결책여공사개치최대화목표경가일치,현시출증장구유격려작용.동시,투자불족정도회수착,증장인자적증대화공고고동소점고빈증가,이득도경쾌、경명현적완해,이차재차과정중공사개치장회상승.
This study is about the influence of growth options on inefficient investment and firm value under controlling shareholder settings.Results indicates that controlling shareholder makes under-investment decision which stray from maximum firm value aim but the growth options that firm owned produces alleviating effect to the under-investment because controlling shareholders like the sustainability of private benefits of control.Further more,the greater the growth factor and the more shares that the controlling shareholders owned,the stronger alleviating effects on controlling shareholders＇ under-investment behavior and firm value increases when they have a more single aim.