CAJ | 학술논문

通过博弈模型发现,在信息完全的条件下,由于个体的自利将导致创新投入行为的事前效率低下,而在信息不完全的条件下产生的羊群行为会使得搭便车的企图落空,因而具有改善这种低效困境的作用。接下来将模型参数化,通过实验室实验的方法,以高年级本科生为被试对象,对理论的预测进行实际验证。最终的实验结果表明：①完全信息条件下行动的事前效率是一个逐渐降低的过程,趋于理论的均衡但又不稳定于其上;②羊群行为确实具有积极的激励作用,但也有很大的局限性。
통과박혁모형발현,재신식완전적조건하,유우개체적자리장도치창신투입행위적사전효솔저하,이재신식불완전적조건하산생적양군행위회사득탑편차적기도락공,인이구유개선저충저효곤경적작용。접하래장모형삼수화,통과실험실실험적방법,이고년급본과생위피시대상,대이론적예측진행실제험증。최종적실험결과표명：①완전신식조건하행동적사전효솔시일개축점강저적과정,추우이론적균형단우불은정우기상;②양군행위학실구유적겁적격려작용,단야유흔대적국한성。
Firstly by using game model we find that individuals＇ self-interest will lead to low ex-ante efficiency of innovation investment in the complete information environment,but the herd behaviors occurring under the condition of incomplete information may be a possible way to solve this problem because they can make the attempt for free riding come to nothing.Then we parameterize the model,carry out laboratory experiments with senior undergraduates as subjects,and test the theoretical predictions.The final results show that： i） the ex-ante efficiency is a gradual process of reducing under the condition of complete information,it decreases towards the theoretical equilibrium but does not stabilize on it;ii） the herd behaviors actually have a positive incentive effect on improving this puzzle,but there are also some limitations.