CAJ | 학술논문

本文在资产转移模型的基础上,结合我国城市公用事业特许经营拍卖中合约设计与执行的实际,从理论上扩展了资产转移模型,得出只有潜在进入企业的成本优势大于资产转移的转移成本时,潜在的进入企业才会参与特许经营权竞标的结论,并针对城市轨道交通洞体轨道与车辆运营分离下特许经营合约存在的问题,提出政府要将资产转移费用作为合约管制的重要内容的政策建议。
본문재자산전이모형적기출상,결합아국성시공용사업특허경영박매중합약설계여집행적실제,종이론상확전료자산전이모형,득출지유잠재진입기업적성본우세대우자산전이적전이성본시,잠재적진입기업재회삼여특허경영권경표적결론,병침대성시궤도교통동체궤도여차량운영분리하특허경영합약존재적문제,제출정부요장자산전이비용작위합약관제적중요내용적정책건의。
On the basis of an asset transfer model,the paper with China＇s urban public utilities franchise auction in contract design and operation shows that only when the cost advantage of the potential entrants exceeds the cost of transfer,the potential entrants can participate in the franchise bidding.The paper also studies the franchise when the cave and operating vehicle are separate in urban rail,and provides a policy recommendation that the government should control transferring cost in franchise.