CAJ | 학술논문

银行危机的救助策略一直是理论界关注的焦点。本文通过构建一个两期模型,以银行危机是否会引发货币危机为评判标准,探讨政府在面对商业银行清偿能力危机时救助与不救助的抉择。经研究发现：当商业银行的不良资产率高,或商业银行在经济中起重要作用,抑或产出的价格弹性较小时,为了避免货币危机的发生,政府应该出手对商业银行提供救助。在相反的情况时,固定汇率制度下,政府为了维护其固定汇率的信誉应该出手对商业银行提供救助;浮动或管理浮动汇率制度下,考虑到商业银行的道德风险问题,政府应该不予以救助。
은행위궤적구조책략일직시이론계관주적초점。본문통과구건일개량기모형,이은행위궤시부회인발화폐위궤위평판표준,탐토정부재면대상업은행청상능력위궤시구조여불구조적결택。경연구발현：당상업은행적불량자산솔고,혹상업은행재경제중기중요작용,억혹산출적개격탄성교소시,위료피면화폐위궤적발생,정부응해출수대상업은행제공구조。재상반적정황시,고정회솔제도하,정부위료유호기고정회솔적신예응해출수대상업은행제공구조;부동혹관리부동회솔제도하,고필도상업은행적도덕풍험문제,정부응해불여이구조。
The paper mainly discussed the choice of the government who was faced with bank running by composing a two-stage model with the criterion of whether the bank crisis would bring out currency crises.We obtained the following conclusions.When the banks＇ losses are large,or the banks play an important role in the economy,or price flexibility of the output is small,the government should recapitalize the banks in order to avoid currency crises.On the contrary,the government should bailout the banks to keep its credibility in pegging exchange rate regime and should not bailout the banks considering the moral risk in the floating or managed floating exchange rate regime.