CAJ | 학술논문

董事会究竟发挥何种作用一直是公司治理争议的焦点问题。本文采用董事会权能对战略咨询和监督控制的双路径结构方程模型（Structure Equation Model，SEM），提出董事会的监控作用表现为以薪酬激励监督CEO为间接手段来改善公司业绩；战略咨询则体现为董事会权能对公司业绩的直接贡献。以中国2005—2007年上市公司样本的测试结果表明：国资委、地方与中央国有控股公司等的董事会薪酬监控作用显著，表现为改善董事和CEO激励不足，“薪酬激励效应”突出，董事权力和治理效果逐年改善，但其战略咨询的治理任务有待加强；私人控股公司董事会的战略和监督二元作用初步凸显，但存在“薪酬挤出效应”，公司治理状况呈弱化趋势，CEO监管与激励有待改善。
동사회구경발휘하충작용일직시공사치리쟁의적초점문제。본문채용동사회권능대전략자순화감독공제적쌍로경결구방정모형（Structure Equation Model，SEM），제출동사회적감공작용표현위이신수격려감독CEO위간접수단래개선공사업적；전략자순칙체현위동사회권능대공사업적적직접공헌。이중국2005—2007년상시공사양본적측시결과표명：국자위、지방여중앙국유공고공사등적동사회신수감공작용현저，표현위개선동사화CEO격려불족，“신수격려효응”돌출，동사권력화치리효과축년개선，단기전략자순적치리임무유대가강；사인공고공사동사회적전략화감독이원작용초보철현，단존재“신수제출효응”，공사치리상황정약화추세，CEO감관여격려유대개선。
Facing the complex and competitive environment, stewardship theory and resource theory support that the board of directors plays important roles in both business strategy and CEO＇s compensation, which challenges the single control role of board supported by agency theory and managerial theory. The paper analyzes Structural Equation Model （SEM） related to dual roles of the board, the direct strategic relationships between board power and firm performance, and the indirect control relationship between board power and firm performance through compensation incentives. The empirical study shows that the boards of state-owned enterprises （SOE） have only significantly control role which mainly focus on improving the compensation of CEO and directors, while the boards of private-owned firms （POF） have both strategic role and control role by testing the sample of Chinese listed companies from the year of 2005 to 2007. Further, the result shows the corporate governance of SOE is becoming better and better by adding the control variables of years, industries and areas, while POF is re- versed. Thus, Chinese companies have to emphasize strategic role of board as the same important as control role for improving their corporate governance in the future.