预测
預測
예측
Forecasting
2011年
2期
46~50
,共null页
管理者—员工纵向信任 互惠 序贯博弈 囚徒困境
管理者—員工縱嚮信任 互惠 序貫博弈 囚徒睏境
관리자—원공종향신임 호혜 서관박혁 수도곤경
manager-employee longitudinal trust; reciprocity; sequential game; prisoner＇s dilemma
本文就管理者—员工纵向信任行为的问题,在一般化假设的基础上,建立了同时考虑了员工的物质效用和互惠心理效用的序贯互惠＂囚徒困境＂博弈模型,进行了定量的分析,分析结果表明：当管理者首先实施不信任行为时,若员工具有完全理性或互惠动机不够大时,员工倾向于选择实施不信任行为;而当管理者首先实施信任行为时,如果员工互惠动机足够大,则员工会选择实施信任行为,如果员工的互惠动机处于两者之间时,则会以一定概率实施信任行为。
本文就管理者—員工縱嚮信任行為的問題,在一般化假設的基礎上,建立瞭同時攷慮瞭員工的物質效用和互惠心理效用的序貫互惠＂囚徒睏境＂博弈模型,進行瞭定量的分析,分析結果錶明：噹管理者首先實施不信任行為時,若員工具有完全理性或互惠動機不夠大時,員工傾嚮于選擇實施不信任行為;而噹管理者首先實施信任行為時,如果員工互惠動機足夠大,則員工會選擇實施信任行為,如果員工的互惠動機處于兩者之間時,則會以一定概率實施信任行為。
본문취관리자—원공종향신임행위적문제,재일반화가설적기출상,건립료동시고필료원공적물질효용화호혜심리효용적서관호혜＂수도곤경＂박혁모형,진행료정량적분석,분석결과표명：당관리자수선실시불신임행위시,약원공구유완전이성혹호혜동궤불구대시,원공경향우선택실시불신임행위;이당관리자수선실시신임행위시,여과원공호혜동궤족구대,칙원공회선택실시신임행위,여과원공적호혜동궤처우량자지간시,칙회이일정개솔실시신임행위。
The paper constructs a prisoner＇s dilemma game model of sequential reciprocity considering both material utility and reciprocity psychological utility of employees based on the general hypothesis and makes a quantificational analysis.The results show that employees who are rational or don＇t have enough reciprocity motivation won＇t conduct trust behavior after the mistrust behavior conducted by manager.The employees who have enough reciprocity motivation will conduct trust behavior after trust behavior conducted by manager and they will conduct trust behavior with certain probability when their reciprocity motivation lies between two cases above.
