经济经纬
經濟經緯
경제경위
Economic Survey
2011年
2期
76~81
,共null页
持股比例 投资者保护 关联交易 掏空
持股比例 投資者保護 關聯交易 掏空
지고비례 투자자보호 관련교역 도공
share ratio ; investor protection ; affiliated transactions; tunneling
通过借鉴LLSV掏空模型来构建数理模型，考察大股东持股比例、投资者保护与掏空行为的内在逻辑关系，并以沪市民营上市公司2007年～2009年的关联交易数据为基础进行了实证分析。结果表明，第一大股东持股比例与掏空行为呈现出典型的倒U型曲线关系，且当企业存在占优控制型大股东时掏空行为更严重；法律环境水平的提高能够有效抑制掏空行为，而信用水平对掏空行为的约束效果并不明显。
通過藉鑒LLSV掏空模型來構建數理模型，攷察大股東持股比例、投資者保護與掏空行為的內在邏輯關繫，併以滬市民營上市公司2007年～2009年的關聯交易數據為基礎進行瞭實證分析。結果錶明，第一大股東持股比例與掏空行為呈現齣典型的倒U型麯線關繫，且噹企業存在佔優控製型大股東時掏空行為更嚴重；法律環境水平的提高能夠有效抑製掏空行為，而信用水平對掏空行為的約束效果併不明顯。
통과차감LLSV도공모형래구건수리모형，고찰대고동지고비례、투자자보호여도공행위적내재라집관계，병이호시민영상시공사2007년～2009년적관련교역수거위기출진행료실증분석。결과표명，제일대고동지고비례여도공행위정현출전형적도U형곡선관계，차당기업존재점우공제형대고동시도공행위경엄중；법률배경수평적제고능구유효억제도공행위，이신용수평대도공행위적약속효과병불명현。
Using the tunneling model of LLSV for reference, the authors develop a mathematical model to examine the inherent relation- ship among share ratio of the large shareholders, investor protection and tunneling behavior and make an empirical analysis on the basis of the affiliated transaction data of the private listed companies in Shanghai Securities Market from 2007 to 2009. The result shows that the relationship between the share ratio of the large shareholders and tunneling behavior presents a ＂U＂ shape curve and the tunneling behavior is more serious when there are controlling large shareholders; the improvement in legal environment can restrict tunneling behavior effectively but the restriction of credit on tunneling behavior is not obvious.
