系统工程理论与实践
繫統工程理論與實踐
계통공정이론여실천
Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice
2011年
3期
450~460
,共null页
供应链 订单农业 CVaR 协调契约机制
供應鏈 訂單農業 CVaR 協調契約機製
공응련 정단농업 CVaR 협조계약궤제
supply chain; contract-farming; CVaR; coordination contract mechanism
基于订单农业特点，构建了由风险中性的公司与风险规避的农户组成的“公司＋农户”，型订单农业供应链模型，并在条件风险估值（conditional value—at—risk，CVaR）风险度量准则下，建立了具有风险规避特性的农户的决策目标函数，分析了供应链分散决策情形下农户与公司的最优决策行为．研究结果表明具有风险规避特性的农户选择的最优产量会随订单价格的增加而增加，并且风险规避特性的农户选择的最优产量严格小于风险中性农户的最优产量．此外，分散决策情形下农户选择的最优产量会低于集中决策情形下整条供应链的最优产量．因此，为了更好地实现供应链的协调，提出了一种“收购补贴＋市场保护价＋保证金”型的协调契约机制，并给出了公司制定的最优补贴系数与订单价格满足的条件．数值分析结果表明该契约机制可以完美地实现“公司＋农户”型订单农业供应链的协调．
基于訂單農業特點，構建瞭由風險中性的公司與風險規避的農戶組成的“公司＋農戶”，型訂單農業供應鏈模型，併在條件風險估值（conditional value—at—risk，CVaR）風險度量準則下，建立瞭具有風險規避特性的農戶的決策目標函數，分析瞭供應鏈分散決策情形下農戶與公司的最優決策行為．研究結果錶明具有風險規避特性的農戶選擇的最優產量會隨訂單價格的增加而增加，併且風險規避特性的農戶選擇的最優產量嚴格小于風險中性農戶的最優產量．此外，分散決策情形下農戶選擇的最優產量會低于集中決策情形下整條供應鏈的最優產量．因此，為瞭更好地實現供應鏈的協調，提齣瞭一種“收購補貼＋市場保護價＋保證金”型的協調契約機製，併給齣瞭公司製定的最優補貼繫數與訂單價格滿足的條件．數值分析結果錶明該契約機製可以完美地實現“公司＋農戶”型訂單農業供應鏈的協調．
기우정단농업특점，구건료유풍험중성적공사여풍험규피적농호조성적“공사＋농호”，형정단농업공응련모형，병재조건풍험고치（conditional value—at—risk，CVaR）풍험도량준칙하，건립료구유풍험규피특성적농호적결책목표함수，분석료공응련분산결책정형하농호여공사적최우결책행위．연구결과표명구유풍험규피특성적농호선택적최우산량회수정단개격적증가이증가，병차풍험규피특성적농호선택적최우산량엄격소우풍험중성농호적최우산량．차외，분산결책정형하농호선택적최우산량회저우집중결책정형하정조공응련적최우산량．인차，위료경호지실현공응련적협조，제출료일충“수구보첩＋시장보호개＋보증금”형적협조계약궤제，병급출료공사제정적최우보첩계수여정단개격만족적조건．수치분석결과표명해계약궤제가이완미지실현“공사＋농호”형정단농업공응련적협조．
The ＂company ＋ farmer＂ contract-farming supply chain model consisting of one risk-neutral company and one risk-averse farmer is proposed and the conditional value-at-risk （CVaR） method is utilized to describe the objective decision function of risk-averse farmer, The farmer＇s optimal decision making behavior under decentralized supply chain is analyzed. The results show that the risk-averse farmer＇s optimal production quantity will be increased with the increasing of contract purchasing price and definitely less than that of risk-neutral farmer. In addition, the results also show that the farmer＇s optimal production quantity under decentralized decision mode will be less than that of centralized decision mode, which gives further need to develop a kind of ＂purchasing subsidy ＋ market protection price ＋ guarantee money＂ coordination mechanism to realize supply chain coordination. The satisfaction conditions for company＇s optimal subsidy coefficient and ordering price are also provided. The feasibility and effciency of the proposed models are manifested by numerical examples.
