CAJ | 학술논문

近年来，地方政府官员热衷于出让土地，现有文献主要强调土地财政。地方政府官员不仅面临财政激励而且还面临政治激励：在地方政府官员晋升以GDP为主要考核指标的激励下，地方政府官员有土地招商引资的动机。本文在理论上证明了．在一个政治集权经济分权的经济体。地方政府官员出让土地的“土地财政”和“土地引资”动机同时存在；在实证上，我们采用省级面板数据发现，地方政府官员热衷于出让土地是源于“土地引资”，而非“土地财政”。本文的工作意味着。中国的土地问题是与土地市场之外的因素联动的．解决中国的土地问题需要土地市场之外的联动改革。
근년래，지방정부관원열충우출양토지，현유문헌주요강조토지재정。지방정부관원불부면림재정격려이차환면림정치격려：재지방정부관원진승이GDP위주요고핵지표적격려하，지방정부관원유토지초상인자적동궤。본문재이론상증명료．재일개정치집권경제분권적경제체。지방정부관원출양토지적“토지재정”화“토지인자”동궤동시존재；재실증상，아문채용성급면판수거발현，지방정부관원열충우출양토지시원우“토지인자”，이비“토지재정”。본문적공작의미착。중국적토지문제시여토지시장지외적인소련동적．해결중국적토지문제수요토지시장지외적련동개혁。
Chinese local officials supplied much more land these years than before, and existing literatures look for the reason in the view of land finance. Actually, local officials are faced with fiscal incentive and political incentive simuhaneously. Local officials have the motive of attracting investment by land policy when central government evaluates them by economic performance. This paper theoretically proved that, in a political centralized and economic decentralized economy, local officials can make fiscal balance better and attract more capital investment by land supply; We then evidently found that the main incentive of land supply by local officials is investment promotion rather than fiscal balancing using Chinese provincial panel data. This finding means that China＇s land issues links with factors outside the land market, and linked reforms outside the land market are needed to solve China＇s land problems.