CAJ | 학술논문

已有研究表明，经理薪酬与负债都会影响企业价值。然而，作为激励机制的薪酬与作为约束机制的负债在影响企业价值上究竟存在何种关系，尽管文献在理论方面有所探讨，但缺乏相应的实证证据支持。以中国沪深两市2002-2008年间的A股上市公司作为研究样本，本文的实证检验结果表明，无论是以薪酬衡量的显性激励还是以在职消费衡量的隐性激励，经理激励和负债在对企业价值的影响上具有显著的替代关系；同时，这一关系在不同性质的企业中，以及不同市场化水平下具有一定的差异性。本文所得出的研究结论不仅丰富了资本结构、委托代理等相关理论，对于现实中的企业决策也具有较强启示意义。
이유연구표명，경리신수여부채도회영향기업개치。연이，작위격려궤제적신수여작위약속궤제적부채재영향기업개치상구경존재하충관계，진관문헌재이론방면유소탐토，단결핍상응적실증증거지지。이중국호심량시2002-2008년간적A고상시공사작위연구양본，본문적실증검험결과표명，무론시이신수형량적현성격려환시이재직소비형량적은성격려，경리격려화부채재대기업개치적영향상구유현저적체대관계；동시，저일관계재불동성질적기업중，이급불동시장화수평하구유일정적차이성。본문소득출적연구결론불부봉부료자본결구、위탁대리등상관이론，대우현실중적기업결책야구유교강계시의의。
The question how the compensation and debt interact to the firm value, though studied in the theoretical literature, has not been empirically studied. Based on the data of Chinese listed firms from 2002 to 2008, the paper shows that there is a substitute relationship between manager incentive and debt, in which the compensation is measured by monetary salary and by perks. Further, we find this relationship differs under different nature of the firm and different level of marketization. Our study not only enriches the theory of capital structure and agency, but also inspires the firm decision.