CAJ | 학술논문

以中国A股市场上市公司2001-2005年的经验数据为样本,实证分析了盈余管理对企业债务期限结构的影响,认为在我国企业的长期债务契约中普遍存在着盈余管理,而且盈余管理越多越容易获得长期借款;如果该企业是国有企业,其为了满足债务契约的保护性条款的盈余管理就变得不显著,这种现象的发生原因在于国有企业中存在着政治性贷款,且又存在预算软约束,故在银行与国有企业的债务契约中对会计信息的依赖会比较少,导致国有企业的盈余管理动机也削弱。由于受到债务契约条件的硬约束,非国有企业则存在着大量的盈余管理以获取长期借款。
이중국A고시장상시공사2001-2005년적경험수거위양본,실증분석료영여관리대기업채무기한결구적영향,인위재아국기업적장기채무계약중보편존재착영여관리,이차영여관리월다월용역획득장기차관;여과해기업시국유기업,기위료만족채무계약적보호성조관적영여관리취변득불현저,저충현상적발생원인재우국유기업중존재착정치성대관,차우존재예산연약속,고재은행여국유기업적채무계약중대회계신식적의뢰회비교소,도치국유기업적영여관리동궤야삭약。유우수도채무계약조건적경약속,비국유기업칙존재착대량적영여관리이획취장기차관。
Based on the data of Chinese listed companies in A share from 2001 to 2005,the paper analyzed the influence of earnings management on firm′s debt maturity structure empirically.Results showed that firm′s earnings management is prevalent in the long term debt contracts,and further more the more earnings management,the easier to get long term debt.But if it was a state-owned entrepreneur（SOE）,it didn′t have much motivation to manage earnings to satisfy all the protective terms in the debt contract.I attributed this phenomenon to the reasons as follows： the loans to SOEs are mostly based on political considerations,and further more there are ＂soft budget＂ in SOEs.So the bank demanded less accounting information in the debt contracting process.So there were no motivations for SOEs to do earnings management.Contrarily,bonded to the debt contract,non-SOEs must do earnings management to get more loans since the terms of loan to them were much more severe.