CAJ | 학술논문

工业生态系统的形成具有不同模式,与之对应的政府作用机制也各不相同,而在自组织模式中,政府主要通过对企业排放进行监管来规范企业行为。以企业和政府行为模式为基础,运用完全信息动态博弈方法探讨企业处理排放的经济效益为负情况下企业与政府的博弈行为,可以发现：政府可以提高监管的概率和效率,并加大对企业排放的处罚,以促进企业进行排放处理,进而促进工业生态系统的自发演进。
공업생태계통적형성구유불동모식,여지대응적정부작용궤제야각불상동,이재자조직모식중,정부주요통과대기업배방진행감관래규범기업행위。이기업화정부행위모식위기출,운용완전신식동태박혁방법탐토기업처리배방적경제효익위부정황하기업여정부적박혁행위,가이발현：정부가이제고감관적개솔화효솔,병가대대기업배방적처벌,이촉진기업진행배방처리,진이촉진공업생태계통적자발연진。
Industrial eco-systems have different formation modes,and the corresponding supervision mechanisms of government also vary.Government mainly inducts the decisions of enterprises in the industrial eco-chain through the regulation of their emissions behavior in the mode of self-organization.On the basis of analysis of the enterprise and government behavior,the enterprises and government actions in the game are discussed by using method of dynamic game with complete information when the economic income of the enterprise＇s discharge is negative.It is found that the enhancement of government supervision on enterprises＇ behavior can improve their motivations of emissions disposal and accelerate the ecological technology diffusion,and promote the self-organization evolution of industrial eco-systems.