CAJ | 학술논문

目前,国有商业银行科层经理人的激励方式上存在重短期绩效轻长期发展的倾向,没有充分考虑到资产收益的时滞性与经理人有限任期的矛盾,导致科层经理人片面追求短期经营效益,一些长期研发、系统性投入因见效慢、时滞长、三五年内不一定有显著成效而被经理人们忽略。本文将银行前期的时滞性的资产状况加入到新任经理人的激励契约中,发现：短期看能明显降低风险成本、激励成本和总代理成本,长期看能促使管理层将自己利益与银行长期经营绩效联系起来,保持长期较高水平的努力,促进银行资产保值增值。据此提出的契约设计方法,应该能解决资产收益时滞性与经理人任职短期性的冲突,建立对经理人绩效的长效考评、激励机制。
목전,국유상업은행과층경리인적격려방식상존재중단기적효경장기발전적경향,몰유충분고필도자산수익적시체성여경리인유한임기적모순,도치과층경리인편면추구단기경영효익,일사장기연발、계통성투입인견효만、시체장、삼오년내불일정유현저성효이피경리인문홀략。본문장은행전기적시체성적자산상황가입도신임경리인적격려계약중,발현：단기간능명현강저풍험성본、격려성본화총대리성본,장기간능촉사관리층장자기이익여은행장기경영적효련계기래,보지장기교고수평적노력,촉진은행자산보치증치。거차제출적계약설계방법,응해능해결자산수익시체성여경리인임직단기성적충돌,건립대경리인적효적장효고평、격려궤제。
At present,branch manager＇s incentive mechanism of state-owned banks incline to emphasize on the short-term performance rather than long-term development,without fully considering the contradictions between time-lagging of assets income and manager＇s limited tenure,resulting in the quick return branch managers are eager to get,ignoring long-term investment.The paper adds the factors of capital with time-lagging yield to the incentive contract of new branch managers.Consequently,it is found that in short term,it could obviously reduce risk costs,incentive costs and general agency costs;in long term,it promote management layers combine their own interests with long-term interests of the banks to make harder efforts so as to facilitate maintaining and increasing of bank assets.Thus,the contract designing should be able to solve the conflicts between time-lagging of assets income and short term tenure to set up long term appraising and incentive mechanism.