CAJ | 학술논문

基于地方分权的视角，本文以环境规制不可直接观测与地方环境决策的策略性博弈为出发点，分别从理论与实证的角度分析是否存在国内地方政府为保持本地的相对优势而采用竞相降低环境标准的方式吸引外商直接投资（FDI）的事实。与已有文献不同，本文通过联合检验地方环境决策竞争效应与环境规制强度对FDI作用方向来判别“逐底竞赛”（race—to-the—bottom）的存在。基于2003--2008年中国277个地级城市构成的面板数据，本文建立空间计量模型对理论命题进行实证检验，结果表明：国内地方政府为吸引FDI而导致的环境政策博弈显著存在，但环境规制对FDI的影响作用平均而言并不显著。分位点估计进一步显示：地方环境决策的竞争程度随分位点的上升而不断增强；环境规制对FDI的作用方向与FDI本身的水平高低密切相关；在FDI低水平的城市间，环境规制对外资并非只是简单的遏止作用；环境“逐底效应”在FDI水平最高的城市间明显弱化，而这一效应在FDI中高水平的城市间最为显著。
기우지방분권적시각，본문이배경규제불가직접관측여지방배경결책적책략성박혁위출발점，분별종이론여실증적각도분석시부존재국내지방정부위보지본지적상대우세이채용경상강저배경표준적방식흡인외상직접투자（FDI）적사실。여이유문헌불동，본문통과연합검험지방배경결책경쟁효응여배경규제강도대FDI작용방향래판별“축저경새”（race—to-the—bottom）적존재。기우2003--2008년중국277개지급성시구성적면판수거，본문건립공간계량모형대이론명제진행실증검험，결과표명：국내지방정부위흡인FDI이도치적배경정책박혁현저존재，단배경규제대FDI적영향작용평균이언병불현저。분위점고계진일보현시：지방배경결책적경쟁정도수분위점적상승이불단증강；배경규제대FDI적작용방향여FDI본신적수평고저밀절상관；재FDI저수평적성시간，배경규제대외자병비지시간단적알지작용；배경“축저효응”재FDI수평최고적성시간명현약화，이저일효응재FDI중고수평적성시간최위현저。
This paper is concerned with testing the hypothesized fact whether Chinese municipal governments have the incentives to strategically reduce their environmental stringency in receiving foreign capitals. We present a new empirical framework that accounts for both unobservability of environmental stringency and strategic interaction among local government. The instrumental variable quantile regression method is employed to estimate the model using the panel data consisting of 277 municipalities in China from 2003 to 2008. Our analysis suggests that local governments do incorporate the environmental policy in neighboring municipalities into their own decision calculus in competition for FDI. This effect is stronger for municipalities with higher level of FDI than with lower FDI. The deterrent effect of environmental stringency upon FDI inflow is significant only when the municipality receives FDI from moderate to high level, implying that the ＂race to the bottom＂ may be absent in the regions with low or highest level of FDI.