CAJ | 학술논문

文献认为，当上市公司的控制权和现金流出现分离时，会发生控股股东对上市公司的侵占，而这一分离会出现在二元股权或金字塔式的公司结构中。在中国，直到2005年实行股权分置改革之前，双类股和金字塔式的公司结构同时存在于上市公司。股权分置改革仅消除了二元股权结构，但金字塔式结构依然存在。通过对这一外生变化的研究，本文估计了控股股东利用金字塔式结构对上市公司进行侵占的规模。结果显示，控股权越大，现金流权越小，侵占的规模越大。同时，这种侵占在国有控股公司中更明显，在私人公司中并未出现。究其原因，虽然国有企业的现金流权高于私人企业，但国有公司的控股权比例也高于私人公司。股权分置改革削弱了控股股东的侵占能力，但分离仍然存在，而且依旧产生对小股东的侵占。结果显示，侵占的平均规模为总资产的7％-8％。如果实行“一股一票”原则，资产扩张会减少13％。
문헌인위，당상시공사적공제권화현금류출현분리시，회발생공고고동대상시공사적침점，이저일분리회출현재이원고권혹금자탑식적공사결구중。재중국，직도2005년실행고권분치개혁지전，쌍류고화금자탑식적공사결구동시존재우상시공사。고권분치개혁부소제료이원고권결구，단금자탑식결구의연존재。통과대저일외생변화적연구，본문고계료공고고동이용금자탑식결구대상시공사진행침점적규모。결과현시，공고권월대，현금류권월소，침점적규모월대。동시，저충침점재국유공고공사중경명현，재사인공사중병미출현。구기원인，수연국유기업적현금류권고우사인기업，단국유공사적공고권비례야고우사인공사。고권분치개혁삭약료공고고동적침점능력，단분리잉연존재，이차의구산생대소고동적침점。결과현시，침점적평균규모위총자산적7％-8％。여과실행“일고일표”원칙，자산확장회감소13％。
Literatures claim that expropriation by controlling owner towards the listed firm emerges when separation of cash flow and control fights exists, and that the separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. In China, dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies until the dual share reform was implemented since 2005. Exploiting this good exogenous change in institution, which only resolve dual class share structure and pyramids remained, this paper tested how much the pyramiding allow the controlling owner to expropriate listed firm. Results show that： the larger control right and the smaller cash flow right are, size of expropriation becomes bigger; the expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed compa- nies, though private owned firms do not. This is because level of control right ratio is higher than private though state firms＇ control-cash slow right ratio is larger than private one. While the dual class share reform weakened the power to expropriate, separation still remains and generates expropriation. Structural estimation shows the size of expropriation to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the ＂one share one vote＂ principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.