管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2011年
2期
45~52
,共null页
陈树桢 熊中楷 李根道 文海鸿
陳樹楨 熊中楷 李根道 文海鴻
진수정 웅중해 리근도 문해홍
双渠道 创新补偿 Pareto改进 两部定价 供应链协调
雙渠道 創新補償 Pareto改進 兩部定價 供應鏈協調
쌍거도 창신보상 Pareto개진 량부정개 공응련협조
dual-channel supply chain; strategic innovative compensation; two-part tariffs; coordination mechanism
电子商务环境下,以创新降低物流、库存等分销成本是零售商赢得生存与发展的重要途径;在渠道和谐与利润最大化驱使下,策略性创新补偿成为制造商的首选策略。本文在传统分销与在线直销价格竞争下,构建模型并研究了上述双渠道供应链的协调问题。研究发现,单独利用创新补偿能实现制造商与零售商收益的Pareto改进,却无法达到供应链整体最优,设计了使渠道协调的两部定价合同。
電子商務環境下,以創新降低物流、庫存等分銷成本是零售商贏得生存與髮展的重要途徑;在渠道和諧與利潤最大化驅使下,策略性創新補償成為製造商的首選策略。本文在傳統分銷與在線直銷價格競爭下,構建模型併研究瞭上述雙渠道供應鏈的協調問題。研究髮現,單獨利用創新補償能實現製造商與零售商收益的Pareto改進,卻無法達到供應鏈整體最優,設計瞭使渠道協調的兩部定價閤同。
전자상무배경하,이창신강저물류、고존등분소성본시령수상영득생존여발전적중요도경;재거도화해여리윤최대화구사하,책략성창신보상성위제조상적수선책략。본문재전통분소여재선직소개격경쟁하,구건모형병연구료상술쌍거도공응련적협조문제。연구발현,단독이용창신보상능실현제조상여령수상수익적Pareto개진,각무법체도공응련정체최우,설계료사거도협조적량부정개합동。
The growing acceptance of third-party logistics service providers to cope with the rapid expansion of e-business is encouraging many manufacturers to engage in the direct sales business.As a result,the dual channel model is becoming increasingly popular.While the dual channel model has its advantages,a manufacturer may become a direct competitor to its sourcing partners.This paper investigates channel conflict issues caused by the dual channel model and approaches to alleviate these issues so that both manufacturers and retailers can benefit from the new trend.The goal of this paper is to provide managerial insights on channel conflict issues caused by the dual channel model.In order to achieve this goal,this paper analyzes these issues by developing a simulation game to represent a two-echelon dual-channel model.This model incorporates key attributes related to the relationships between manufacturers and retailers.They act independently based on price competition between the online direct and traditional channels.We also take into account the fact that manufacturers and retailers need to coordinate sales channels.In the dual-channel model,retailers in the lower echelon need to try reducing logistics /inventory operating costs besides changing pricing policy in order to stay competitive.In response to retailers' strategic changes,their manufacturers need to ensure that online direct sales and traditional sales channels coexist in order to cope with new strategic movement of retailers.We also analyze and compare strategic movements of manufacturers and retailers.In the first part,we study and compare two business cases between a decentralized manufacturer using innovative compensation strategy,and another manufacturer not using this strategy.These two case studies show that the faster the initial distribution cost of the retailer channel declines,the higher the optimal level of investment that a manufacturer is more willing to compensate for its retailer's innovative compensation.A manufacturer will increase its wholesale price and keep the online channel price as before to balance the investment cost of retailers.A retailer will increase investment in channel innovation and reduce its retail price at the same time.Both manufacturers and retailers can benefit from a manufacturer's compensation investment.In addition,we discuss and compare innovative compensation investment under centralized and decentralize decision-making processes.In the centralized decision making process,the retailer price is always the lowest when the online price remains the same.This finding is contrary to our expectations.With the decentralized decision-making process,the entire supply chain always has the highest profit and manufacturers have the highest investment in innovation activities.With the decentralized decision making process,a manufacturer has an incentive to design mechanisms to coordinate with retailers to benefit both parties.In the second part,we examine ways to adjust manufacturer-retailer relationships using two-part tariffs.Some cases show that two-part tariffs can coordinate traditional channels by turning a retailer into a "residual claimant" of channel profits.However,the "residual clamant"mechanism breaks down in the dual-channel model.Unexpectedly,two-part tariffs can coordinate the dual-channel model and a manufacturer can effectively set its wholesale price and fix fees at the right level.At the same time,a manufacturer canremove the double marginalization problem in the dual-channel so that its retailers can become a residual claimant for channel profits.In contrast with the sole traditional channel,infinite two-part tariffs exist and can coordinate dual-channel supply chains.In summary,conflicts can occur and have practical implications on distribution strategy as more manufacturers engage into direct sales channels.The proposed two-part tariffs to coordinate the dual channel model can help alleviate the possibility of channel conflicts and benefit both manufacturers and retailers.