中国行政管理
中國行政管理
중국행정관리
Chinese Public Administration
2011年
7期
111~114
,共null页
邻避效应 补偿机制 公民参与
鄰避效應 補償機製 公民參與
린피효응 보상궤제 공민삼여
NIMBY effect, compensation mechanism, citizen participation
在公益性项目建设与运营中所出现的邻避效应,是追求公共利益最大化和政策成本最小化的政府在民主行政的条件下不可回避的决策困境。本文分析了邻避效应的经济性补偿和社会心理性补偿的关系,根据集体行动理论和邻避效应的特征,提出审慎运用公民参与来实现公益性项目外部效应的内部化。在中国国情条件下,公民参与的制度选择倾向采取法团主义的模式,文章结合上海市实践进行了实证分析。
在公益性項目建設與運營中所齣現的鄰避效應,是追求公共利益最大化和政策成本最小化的政府在民主行政的條件下不可迴避的決策睏境。本文分析瞭鄰避效應的經濟性補償和社會心理性補償的關繫,根據集體行動理論和鄰避效應的特徵,提齣審慎運用公民參與來實現公益性項目外部效應的內部化。在中國國情條件下,公民參與的製度選擇傾嚮採取法糰主義的模式,文章結閤上海市實踐進行瞭實證分析。
재공익성항목건설여운영중소출현적린피효응,시추구공공이익최대화화정책성본최소화적정부재민주행정적조건하불가회피적결책곤경。본문분석료린피효응적경제성보상화사회심이성보상적관계,근거집체행동이론화린피효응적특정,제출심신운용공민삼여래실현공익성항목외부효응적내부화。재중국국정조건하,공민삼여적제도선택경향채취법단주의적모식,문장결합상해시실천진행료실증분석。
Not -In -My -Back -Yard （NIMBY） effect in building and operating public works projects has been a decision dilemma for governments aiming to maximize public interests and minimize policy costs in an age of democratic administration. This paper first analyzes the relation between economic and sociopsychological compensation. According to the logic of collective action and the characters of NIMBY effect, it proposes a prudent use of citizen participation to internalize the externalities of NIMBY projects. The paper argues that the institutional choice of citizen participation in dealing with NIMBY effect in China tends to favor corporatism, and such a point is applied to the practice in Shanghai.
