CAJ | 학술논문

电信运营商不愿参与“共建共享”缘于这项政策可能会降低产品差异化程度，加剧竞争。文章基于三阶段轮辐模型，从福利经济学角度考察无规制和存在接入价格规制情形下的最优投资水平发现，如果企业为争夺老用户竞争，溢出效应不仅会降低投资厂商与接入厂商之间的差异化，而且会导致厂商投资更加偏离社会最优投资水平；如果企业定位于拓展新用户，溢出效应反而可以提高全行业的经济效益，同时使得更多消费者享受到电信服务。但是，为消除市场失灵带来的投资偏离而采取价格规制政策会进一步扭曲厂商投资的激励。基于此，文章认为在电信用户迅速增长的今天，政府应出台更多“共建共享”的配套政策促进企业投资。
전신운영상불원삼여“공건공향”연우저항정책가능회강저산품차이화정도，가극경쟁。문장기우삼계단륜복모형，종복리경제학각도고찰무규제화존재접입개격규제정형하적최우투자수평발현，여과기업위쟁탈로용호경쟁，일출효응불부회강저투자엄상여접입엄상지간적차이화，이차회도치엄상투자경가편리사회최우투자수평；여과기업정위우탁전신용호，일출효응반이가이제고전행업적경제효익，동시사득경다소비자향수도전신복무。단시，위소제시장실령대래적투자편리이채취개격규제정책회진일보뉴곡엄상투자적격려。기우차，문장인위재전신용호신속증장적금천，정부응출태경다“공건공향”적배투정책촉진기업투자。
The unwillingness of network operators to participate in construction sharing is due to the possible reduction in differentiation degree of products and more severe competition caused by this policy. Based on a threestage spokes model, this paper studies the optimal investment level with and without price regulation from the angle of welfare economics. It shows as follows： firstly, if firms are competing for existing customers, spillover effect will not only lead to the reduction in the difference between the investor and the invested, but also the greater deviation of dependent investment from social optimal investment level; secondly, if firms are aiming at the expansion of new customers, spillover effect can raise the economic performance of telecommunications industry and expand the coverage of telecommu- nications services. But price regulation policy which is taken to offset investment deviation caused by market imperfection will further distort investment incentives. So it considers that the governments should implement more policies matching for construction sharing to promote the investment with the rapid increase in telecommunication customers today.