CAJ | 학술논문

设计了一种先＂拍卖＂再＂谈判＂的两阶段采购机制,实现了更具分配效率且更符合实际的单物品采购运作。该机制设计的特色在于考虑到：采购业务中同时存在关于价格和质量的投标竞争与议价谈判,供应商与采购商在采购的不同阶段的私有信息披露问题,以及谈判阶段的时间成本和相应均衡策略问题。研究的基本结论是：在机制的拍卖阶段中,存在最佳近视反应意义下的招投标策略;机制的议价阶段在均衡路径上的分配结果,与买卖双方的真实价值具有重要的确定性关系;议价阶段实现了对拍卖阶段分配效率的改进,且买卖双方都存在关于质量和价格的贝叶斯纳什均衡议价策略与相关信念。
설계료일충선＂박매＂재＂담판＂적량계단채구궤제,실현료경구분배효솔차경부합실제적단물품채구운작。해궤제설계적특색재우고필도：채구업무중동시존재관우개격화질량적투표경쟁여의개담판,공응상여채구상재채구적불동계단적사유신식피로문제,이급담판계단적시간성본화상응균형책략문제。연구적기본결론시：재궤제적박매계단중,존재최가근시반응의의하적초투표책략;궤제적의개계단재균형로경상적분배결과,여매매쌍방적진실개치구유중요적학정성관계;의개계단실현료대박매계단분배효솔적개진,차매매쌍방도존재관우질량화개격적패협사납십균형의개책략여상관신념。
We design a two-stage mechanism for more efficient and practical procurement operations,which implements first multi-attributes auction then bargaining.Main novelty of the mechanism is that we focus on three characteristics of practical procurement： both bidding and bargaining for price and qualities,both buyer and seller＇s information revelation problem,and time cost problem with corresponding strategies construction.We show that,the auction stage holds MBR（Myopic Best Response） incentive compatible for buyer and sellers.Also,allocation outcome on equilibrium path and its relationship with buyer and seller＇s real valuation is presented.Bargaining stage improves the efficiency of auction stage,especially;we show there exist Nash-Bayesian equilibrium strategies and corresponding beliefs for both players in the mechanism.