CAJ | 학술논문

在一个简单的框架下，笔者运用进化博弈理论从监督的角度分析了大股东与监管当局的博弈关系。博弈的复制动态方程分析表明：监管当局的超额收益、正常收益、大股东的掏空金额、租金等初始条对博弈均衡的结果都将产生影响。借鉴瓦尔拉斯一般均衡分析范式得出，不同的掏空金额会导致博弈双方出现多重均衡，但并非所有均衡点都具有安定性。
재일개간단적광가하，필자운용진화박혁이론종감독적각도분석료대고동여감관당국적박혁관계。박혁적복제동태방정분석표명：감관당국적초액수익、정상수익、대고동적도공금액、조금등초시조대박혁균형적결과도장산생영향。차감와이랍사일반균형분석범식득출，불동적도공금액회도치박혁쌍방출현다중균형，단병비소유균형점도구유안정성。
In a simple framework, the authors established an evolutionary game model from the view of supervision to analyze the relationship between block shareholder and the authority. The results of the replicated dynamics equation show that the initial conditions of the excess gains and normal income of the authority, tunneling amount and the rent of the block shareholders all affect result of the game equilibrium ; The reference to Walras＇ s general equilibrium analysis model inferred that different amounts of tunneling cause different equilibrium points, but not all the points are stable.