CAJ | 학술논문

以金融契约和控制权配置理论为基础，构建了“金融契约一控制权配置一管理者投资决策”的理论分析框架，揭示了不同金融契约结构下企业控制权配置的属性特征及其对管理者投资决策的影响，并以2002～2005年中国上市公司数据进行了实证检验。结果表明，企业负债规模与过度投资之间存在非线性U型关系；同时，流通股比例增加则有利于抑制管理层过度投资，但第一大股东持股比例增加不仅不能抑制过度投资，反而会恶化过度投资。进一步研究发现，其他条件相同的情形下，地方国企的过度投资程度最高，央属国企的过度投资水平居中，而民营企业的过度投资水平最低。
이금융계약화공제권배치이론위기출，구건료“금융계약일공제권배치일관리자투자결책”적이론분석광가，게시료불동금융계약결구하기업공제권배치적속성특정급기대관리자투자결책적영향，병이2002～2005년중국상시공사수거진행료실증검험。결과표명，기업부채규모여과도투자지간존재비선성U형관계；동시，류통고비례증가칙유리우억제관리층과도투자，단제일대고동지고비례증가불부불능억제과도투자，반이회악화과도투자。진일보연구발현，기타조건상동적정형하，지방국기적과도투자정도최고，앙속국기적과도투자수평거중，이민영기업적과도투자수평최저。
Through buliding the research framework about ＂financial contract - allocation of cash flow right and con- trol right - managerial investment decision＂, this paper analyzes the relationship between overinvestment and financial contract from the angel of control right, with some empirical studies using the samples from 2002 - 2005 in Chinese A stock market. The results show that, the relationship between overinvestment and debt ratio takes on U curve, and the in- crease of traded stock will significantly decrease overinvestment, but the increase of shares by dominant shareholder will aggravate overinvestment. We also find that, among the three kinds of enterprise, the level of overinvestment is the highest in local SOEs but is the lowest in private firms, and the level of overinvestment in central SOEs is in the middle.