预测
預測
예측
Forecasting
2011年
4期
20~24
,共null页
客户知识获取 协同 道德风险 供应链
客戶知識穫取 協同 道德風險 供應鏈
객호지식획취 협동 도덕풍험 공응련
customer knowledge acquisition; collaboration; moral hazard; supply chain
本文研究了供应链环境下面临双边道德风险时制造商与零售商协同获取客户知识的契约设计问题。首先分析了制造商与零售商协同获取客户知识的双边道德风险与客户知识绩效,然后运用委托代理理论建立了合作契约模型并得出结论:客户知识协同获取的最优收益分享比例与制造商和零售商的努力及其成本系数无关.但与他们的努力弹性系数及其成本函数的指数相关;当制造商增加努力对客户知识获取绩效贡献较大时,制造商将分配给自己较大的收益份额,而当零售商增加努力对客户知识获取绩效贡献更大时,制造商将给零售商较高的收益分享比例,这激励了双方合作,降低了双边道德风险。最后,通过实例进一步说明了契约设计及其变量之间的关系。
本文研究瞭供應鏈環境下麵臨雙邊道德風險時製造商與零售商協同穫取客戶知識的契約設計問題。首先分析瞭製造商與零售商協同穫取客戶知識的雙邊道德風險與客戶知識績效,然後運用委託代理理論建立瞭閤作契約模型併得齣結論:客戶知識協同穫取的最優收益分享比例與製造商和零售商的努力及其成本繫數無關.但與他們的努力彈性繫數及其成本函數的指數相關;噹製造商增加努力對客戶知識穫取績效貢獻較大時,製造商將分配給自己較大的收益份額,而噹零售商增加努力對客戶知識穫取績效貢獻更大時,製造商將給零售商較高的收益分享比例,這激勵瞭雙方閤作,降低瞭雙邊道德風險。最後,通過實例進一步說明瞭契約設計及其變量之間的關繫。
본문연구료공응련배경하면림쌍변도덕풍험시제조상여령수상협동획취객호지식적계약설계문제。수선분석료제조상여령수상협동획취객호지식적쌍변도덕풍험여객호지식적효,연후운용위탁대리이론건립료합작계약모형병득출결론:객호지식협동획취적최우수익분향비례여제조상화령수상적노력급기성본계수무관.단여타문적노력탄성계수급기성본함수적지수상관;당제조상증가노력대객호지식획취적효공헌교대시,제조상장분배급자기교대적수익빈액,이당령수상증가노력대객호지식획취적효공헌경대시,제조상장급령수상교고적수익분향비례,저격려료쌍방합작,강저료쌍변도덕풍험。최후,통과실례진일보설명료계약설계급기변량지간적관계。
Contract on customer knowledge collaborative acquisition for manufacturer and retailer with double-sided moral hazard was researched. First, double-sided moral hazard in process of customer knowledge collaborative acquisition was analyzed and effects of different efforts as well as their coefficients of elasticity were considered to construct customer knowledge performance function. Then, cooperation contract was designed through building mathematic model with prin- ciple-agent theory. The results showed that the optimal revenue sharing rate of customer knowledge collaborative acquisi- tion was not relative with efforts of manufacturer and retailer and their cost-of-effort coefficient, while relative with effort- elasticity and exponents of cost-of-effort functions. The results also explored that when manufacturer' s efforts contributed more for customer knowledge acquisition, she will share more revenue to give itself incentive; when retailer' s efforts contributed more, manufacturer will let him share more revenue for incentive; this incentive mechanism decreased the double-sided moral hazard. Finally, a numerical example showed furtherly the contract design and relationships between its variables.