CAJ | 학술논문

特殊工种是我国自1951年以来一直沿用的劳动安全保护政策。尽管期间进行了多次适应性调整，但在计划经济向市场经济转型后，因相关利益主体的理性博弈及其行为扭曲，导致特殊工种制度中的逆向选择和道德风险问题集中爆发。主要表现在多主体合谋造假、“搭便车”和风险分配不公平等。由于特殊工种最终以提前退休的方式进行补偿，风险行为与责任不一致导致了大量的成本和风险多维转嫁。转嫁的结果不仅使养老保险面临“公地悲剧”，而且使企业失去了劳动安全激励和惩罚威胁，最终使劳动者处于持续的风险暴露状态。本文试图通过对各利益主体博弈行为的分析，找到其行为扭曲的背后机理，从而把特殊工种政策还原为劳动风险决策过程，寻找政策的合理化方向。
특수공충시아국자1951년이래일직연용적노동안전보호정책。진관기간진행료다차괄응성조정，단재계화경제향시장경제전형후，인상관이익주체적이성박혁급기행위뉴곡，도치특수공충제도중적역향선택화도덕풍험문제집중폭발。주요표현재다주체합모조가、“탑편차”화풍험분배불공평등。유우특수공충최종이제전퇴휴적방식진행보상，풍험행위여책임불일치도치료대량적성본화풍험다유전가。전가적결과불부사양로보험면림“공지비극”，이차사기업실거료노동안전격려화징벌위협，최종사노동자처우지속적풍험폭로상태。본문시도통과대각이익주체박혁행위적분석，조도기행위뉴곡적배후궤리，종이파특수공충정책환원위노동풍험결책과정，심조정책적합이화방향。
Special type of work is a labor-protecting policy in China since 1951. During this period, the central government has made adaptive adjustment many times. However, during the process of transition from planned economy to market-based economy and because the rational game of relevant interested parties and their distorted behaviors, the adverse selection and moral hazard in the system of special type of work began to erupt. The problems are： the collusion among relevant parties to make false certifications; free riding and unequal distribution of risk. The workers of special type of work are compensated by early retirement and the inconsistencies between risk behaviors and responsibilities result in cost and risk transfers in magnitude. The consequences are： not only the pension fund faces the tragedy of common resources, but also the firms lose the incentives to tighten the labor security and punishment and are exposed to risks. The paper attempts to analyze the gaming behavior of relevant interested parties and find the underlying mechanism. Through the analysis, we restore the policy of special type of work to the decision process on labor risk and seek the optimal policy directions.