CAJ | 학술논문

随着对工业和城市生活污水等点源污染治理能力的不断增强,农业非点源污染对水质环境的影响日益凸现。相对于点源污染,非点源污染发生的不确定时间、不确定途径、不确定量等特点给治理政策的制定带来很大难度。本文从著名的公地悲剧现象出发,着力从市场博弈及政府监督博弈两个模型分析非点源污染制造者之间的博弈格局,并提出以＂集体表现＂的形式对非点源污染进行管理和控制。市场博弈模型中以一定的排污削减目标为前提,确定以成本最优的原则进行点源-非点源排污权交易是可行且有效率的;而政府监督博弈模型的结果显示：合理的环境补贴和惩罚机制、政府对自身声誉及公众形象的重视及维护对非点源污染治理起正向促进作用。
수착대공업화성시생활오수등점원오염치리능력적불단증강,농업비점원오염대수질배경적영향일익철현。상대우점원오염,비점원오염발생적불학정시간、불학정도경、불학정량등특점급치리정책적제정대래흔대난도。본문종저명적공지비극현상출발,착력종시장박혁급정부감독박혁량개모형분석비점원오염제조자지간적박혁격국,병제출이＂집체표현＂적형식대비점원오염진행관리화공제。시장박혁모형중이일정적배오삭감목표위전제,학정이성본최우적원칙진행점원-비점원배오권교역시가행차유효솔적;이정부감독박혁모형적결과현시：합리적배경보첩화징벌궤제、정부대자신성예급공음형상적중시급유호대비점원오염치리기정향촉진작용。
With the increasing ability to deal with point source pollution,such as industrial and urban life sewage,the impact of agricultural non-point source pollution on water quality environment has become more and more apparent.Compared with point source pollution,non-point source pollution occurs at an uncertain time,in an uncertain way and with uncertain quantity,which brings much more difficulties to the making of some relevant control policies.Beginning with the famous phenomenon of the Tragedy of Commons,this paper analyzes the game situation among the non-point pollution makers based on the marketing game model and the government supervision game model,and then proposes a way to manage and control non-point pollution in the form of ＂collective performance＂.Premising with the target of decreasing pollutant discharge,marketing game model proves that it is feasible and efficient to do the trade on point-nonpoint source pollution on the basis of the principle of Optimal Cost,while the results of the government supervision game model show that： a reasonable environment subsidy and punishment mechanism,and government＇s attaching importance to the self-reputation and public image will play a positive role in promoting non-point source pollution control.