心理科学
心理科學
심이과학
Psychological Science
2011年
4期
970~973
,共null页
贝叶斯推理 认知偏向 直觉调整差误 后验概率
貝葉斯推理 認知偏嚮 直覺調整差誤 後驗概率
패협사추리 인지편향 직각조정차오 후험개솔
Bayesian reasoning, cognitive bias, intuitively adjust deviation, post-probability
采用贝叶斯推理问题作为实验材料,探讨被试解决贝叶斯推理问题的启发式策略,从认知偏向的角度分析该问题的困难原因。结果发现:(1)贝叶斯推理问题解决过程中的“可得性启发”与后验概率估计过程中的“直觉调整差误”密切相关;(2)贝叶斯推理问题解决过程中文、理科被试都同样会产生“直觉调整差误”偏向;(3)贝叶斯推理问题解决过程中的后验概率估计值和对推理问题中包括“虚报率”信息的命题的“可得性”测量所得主观概率之间存在显著的负相关。
採用貝葉斯推理問題作為實驗材料,探討被試解決貝葉斯推理問題的啟髮式策略,從認知偏嚮的角度分析該問題的睏難原因。結果髮現:(1)貝葉斯推理問題解決過程中的“可得性啟髮”與後驗概率估計過程中的“直覺調整差誤”密切相關;(2)貝葉斯推理問題解決過程中文、理科被試都同樣會產生“直覺調整差誤”偏嚮;(3)貝葉斯推理問題解決過程中的後驗概率估計值和對推理問題中包括“虛報率”信息的命題的“可得性”測量所得主觀概率之間存在顯著的負相關。
채용패협사추리문제작위실험재료,탐토피시해결패협사추리문제적계발식책략,종인지편향적각도분석해문제적곤난원인。결과발현:(1)패협사추리문제해결과정중적“가득성계발”여후험개솔고계과정중적“직각조정차오”밀절상관;(2)패협사추리문제해결과정중문、이과피시도동양회산생“직각조정차오”편향;(3)패협사추리문제해결과정중적후험개솔고계치화대추리문제중포괄“허보솔”신식적명제적“가득성”측량소득주관개솔지간존재현저적부상관。
Kahneman and Tversky (1972) assumed that people's intuitive reasoning was far from Bayesian Theorem, even they didn' t follow the rule at all; Gould (1992) suggested that people reasons not following the rule by nature; Slovic and Lchtenstein (1971), however, considered that people's intuitive reasoning was almost coincident with the result of computing in affirmation or negation direction, only precision was inadequate; Peterson and Beach (1967) thought also that, human being as a intuitive statistician, his probability's reasoning way was commonly similar with compute process of Bayesian rule. So, what caused so different conclusion, and what effect Bayesian reasoning? On the basis of the findings above, this study aimed to explore cognitive biases which existed in the process of Bayesian reasoning, and to analyse the effects of these biases on Bayesian reasoning. Besides, this study investigated the extent of biases in different task. The present study also discussed the difference on reasoning results of participants majored in arts or science caused by their difference on mathematical logic capability. The experiment was collectively conducted with totally 168 arts and science students, among which 79 students majored in commerce and 89 in Chinese and History. All participants were not familiar with Bayesian inference rule. 168 questionnaires were collected respectively. This research adopted ' the study and explore department problem', ' the office problem' and ' the model workshop problem' as experimental materials, and the tests for the extent of 'availability m false report rate' in Bayesian reasoning task was done. Meanwhile, a variance analysis of the absolute value of difference between posterior prohability and normal value was done. The results indicated that: (1)Available heuristic was closely related with 'intuitively adjust deviation' bias in the process of prohability's evaluation; (2) The 'anchoring reference error' bias and the 'intuitively adjust deviation' bias could all be found among arts and science students; (3) There was remarkable negative correlation between the evaluation of post-probability and the subjective prohability of proposition including false report bate. The results of this study suggested that heuristic cognitive bias in the process of people's Bayesian reasoning affect the precise of prohability's evaluation. It also indicated that the extent of bias was different with reasoning task, the bias of participants majored in arts or science had no difference. All these findings offered psychological evidence to realize, find out and alarm common mistakes in the process of people's Bayesian reasoning so as to learn the skill of probability's thinking and improve ability of Bayesian reasoning.