CAJ | 학술논문

对赌协议在我国风险投资领域已有较多表现，实践中因对赌失败所引发的执行困境时有发生。本文阐明了本土背景下的“对赌协议”产生基础在于企业的股权融资偏好行为，分析了对赌协议在不完全契约状态下表现出的射幸性特点，论证了基于企业估值调整所进行的条款安排并不违背法律所追求的公平和效率目标。在此基础上，文章认为，对赌协议的可执行问题最终需回归到对其效力的认定上。合法性、契约自由以及公司自治等原则是审视此类协议效力的重要标准。
대도협의재아국풍험투자영역이유교다표현，실천중인대도실패소인발적집행곤경시유발생。본문천명료본토배경하적“대도협의”산생기출재우기업적고권융자편호행위，분석료대도협의재불완전계약상태하표현출적사행성특점，론증료기우기업고치조정소진행적조관안배병불위배법률소추구적공평화효솔목표。재차기출상，문장인위，대도협의적가집행문제최종수회귀도대기효력적인정상。합법성、계약자유이급공사자치등원칙시심시차류협의효력적중요표준。
The Valuation Adjustment Mechanism （VAM） in the field of venture capital in China has been seen a lot, the implementation difficulties caused by VAM failure have often occurred. This article explains that the VAM in China originate from companies＇ equity financing preference behavior, and analyzes the radio fortunate characteristic of VAM under the condition of the incomplete contract. In addition, this paper shows that the terms arrangement based on the business valuation adjustments does not violate the law to pursue equity and efficiency goals. Furthermore, the article discusses that enforceability of VAM will ultimately be determined by its effectiveness, and it should also be judged by legitimacy, freedom of contract and corporate self-government, etc.