CAJ | 학술논문

森林保险具有准公共物品性质。目前财政补贴政策在森林保险中遇到的问题来自于政府与保险公司之间的信息不对称,从而导致补贴政策的低效率。文章从信息经济学角度通过建立斯坦科尔博格（stackbarg）博奕模型,论证不对称信息环境下政府对保险公司经营森林保险的财政补贴的效率损失及保险公司策略性反应。由此认为,政府应改进与保险公司之间的关系,积极取信于保险公司,使企业充分认识到财政政策具有长期的执行效力与可信度,从而使保险公司意识到努力增加森林保险供给才是其真正利益所在。
삼림보험구유준공공물품성질。목전재정보첩정책재삼림보험중우도적문제래자우정부여보험공사지간적신식불대칭,종이도치보첩정책적저효솔。문장종신식경제학각도통과건립사탄과이박격（stackbarg）박혁모형,론증불대칭신식배경하정부대보험공사경영삼림보험적재정보첩적효솔손실급보험공사책략성반응。유차인위,정부응개진여보험공사지간적관계,적겁취신우보험공사,사기업충분인식도재정정책구유장기적집행효력여가신도,종이사보험공사의식도노력증가삼림보험공급재시기진정이익소재。
Forest insurance is quasi-public goods. Subsidies in the current financial problems encountered in the for- est insurance, asymmetry between government and insurance companies from the information, resulting in low effi- ciency of subsidies. From information economics point of view through the creation of Stan Cole Borg （stack barg） Game model, the paper demonstrate the government under asymmetric information environment forest insurance in- surance company financial subsidies to efficiency losses and insurance company＇s strategic response. Government should improve the relationship between the insurance company, active gain the trust of insurance companies, to en- able enterprises to fully understand the long-term fiscal policy effectiveness of the implementation and credibility, so that the insurance company is aware of efforts to increase the supply of forest insurance is the real interests for the insurance business.