CAJ | 학술논문

本文运用前景理论,探讨存在缺货损失情况下由损失厌恶型零售商和损失厌恶型供应商组成的供应链价格补贴契约设计。文章研究供应商为损失厌恶型时,损失厌恶型零售商分别在批发价格契约和价格补贴契约下的订货行为。研究结果表明损失厌恶型零售商在批发价格契约下的最优订货量可能偏离系统最优订货量,损失厌恶型供应商通过价格补贴契约可以协调整个供应链。最后通过算例分析,验证了价格补贴契约在协调供应链中的有效性。
본문운용전경이론,탐토존재결화손실정황하유손실염악형령수상화손실염악형공응상조성적공응련개격보첩계약설계。문장연구공응상위손실염악형시,손실염악형령수상분별재비발개격계약화개격보첩계약하적정화행위。연구결과표명손실염악형령수상재비발개격계약하적최우정화량가능편리계통최우정화량,손실염악형공응상통과개격보첩계약가이협조정개공응련。최후통과산례분석,험증료개격보첩계약재협조공응련중적유효성。
Perishable products have the nature of demand uncertainty,and short sales period and production lead time.Business partners in perishable supply chains need to address contract designs based on risk preference of decision makers.This paper studies behaviors of decision makers who have preference to either the wholesale price contract or markdown money contract based on the prospect theory. In the first part,we find that contract mechanisms without considering the risk attitude of decision-makers are only applicable to risk-neutral decision-makers and may not be applicable to the decision makers with risk preferences.We further review research results using financial engineering theories and methods to describe risk attitude of decision maker in supply chains and optimize risk decision.In the second part,we establish a decision-making model for centralized supply chains.We obtain the optimal order quantity of centralized supply chains.The optimal order quality is used as a benchmark to coordinate decentralized supply chains.In the third part,we establish a decision-making model for retailer and supplier under the wholesale price contract.We obtain the optimal order quantity for the retailer and the optimal wholesale price for the supplier.We find that because of retailer＇s loss aversion characteristics the optimal order quality from the retailer with stock loss may deviate from the optimal quality of centralized supply chains under the wholesale price contract.Therefore,it is important to consider other contracts in order to have effective supply chain coordination.In the fourth part,we establish a decision-making model for retailer and supplier under the markdown money contract.We obtain an optimal solution for the markdown money contract.We prove that the markdown money contract can help improve supply chain coordination.Finally,a case study is simulated to show intuitively the optimal decision made by retailer and supplier under both contracts.Our simulation demonstrates that the order quality from loss-averse retailers under the wholesale price contract is lower than that of decentralized supply chains.The loss-averse supplier can use the markdown money contract to equalize the optimal order quality of loss-averse retailers to that of centralized supply chains.The solution can help improve supply chain coordination. In summary,according to the framework of prospect theory the retailer under wholesale price contract may not order the same quantity as that of centralized supply chains due to loss aversion characteristics.When retailer orders quantity are not the same as that of centralized supply chains under the wholesale price contract,the loss-averse supplier can use markdown money contract to make the optimal order quantity of loss-averse retailers the same as that of centralized supply chains.Therefore,supply chain coordination can be improved.Future research can focus on understanding supply chain contract design under the following conditions： asymmetric information and loss aversion decision-makers,as well as market demand information update with risk-averse decision-makers.