CAJ | 학술논문

探讨了信息不对称条件下提前期可以通过额外的赶工成本来加以控制的两级供应链协调问题。分别建立了分散决策和集中决策情形下的可控提前期供应链库存优化模型,并在充分考虑各参与方个体理性的基础上,探讨了分销商库存信息不对称情形下的供应链协调机制。最后通过数值分析证明该协调机制既能诱使分销商申报真实的库存持有成本信息,又能够在供应链合作双方成本均有改进的基础上,达到供应链系统的最优。
탐토료신식불대칭조건하제전기가이통과액외적간공성본래가이공제적량급공응련협조문제。분별건립료분산결책화집중결책정형하적가공제전기공응련고존우화모형,병재충분고필각삼여방개체이성적기출상,탐토료분소상고존신식불대칭정형하적공응련협조궤제。최후통과수치분석증명해협조궤제기능유사분소상신보진실적고존지유성본신식,우능구재공응련합작쌍방성본균유개진적기출상,체도공응련계통적최우。
Current literature shows that Just-in-Time（JIT） can significantly reduce lead time and inventory-related costs simultaneously.Time-based competition（TBC） focusing on the reduction of overall system lead time has been one of favorite topics for both researchers and practitioners.Lead time reduction can lower the amounts of safety stock,reduce the loss caused by stock-outs,and improve customer service levels.In today＇s hyper competitive environment,lead time reduction is becoming an effective way to increase supply chain response and an important source of competitive advantage.However,in most of the traditional economic order quantity（EOQ） literature dealing with inventory problem,either using deterministic or probabilistic models,lead time is viewed as a prescribed constant or a stochastic variable.Therefore,controlling lead time is not feasible and realistic in practical situations.To overcome the issue,an increasing number of literatures consider lead time as a decision variable.Still,these literatures either consider the controllable lead time optimization problem from the perspective of a single facility,or consider inventory models with controllable lead time from the perspective of integrated supply chains.An integrated supply chain assumes that a central planner possesses perfect information and has the power to impose a globally optimal inventory policy on each entity in order to maximize overall channel performance.In this paper,we make two major contributions to the present literature on supply chain optimization problems related to controllable lead time.First,we relax the assumption in the former literature from the perspective of supply chain by asserting that long-term strategic partnerships between vendor and buyer are well established and each party can bargain and cooperate with each other to obtain an optimal integrated joint policy under centralized decision.We further assume that the vendor and the buyer aim to maximize individual benefits in the decentralized（two-echelon） supply chain with controllable lead time.Second,in practical situations,the information asymmetry problem exists in the entire supply chain because individual parties are reluctant of disclosing confidential information such as internal variable cost.Information asymmetry can confer incentive mechanisms designed for symmetric information ineffective.As a result,scholars and practitioners are paying attention to the importance of coordinated relationships between suppliers and buyers in a supply chain under the condition of asymmetric information.This paper considers the setting where the buyer has private cost information and the vendor uses different sets of coordination mechanisms based on the screening game theory.Through the buyer＇s selection,the vendor can learn about the buyer＇s real cost indirectly and improve the cost of managing supply chains.The results of our numerical examples show that shortening lead time can improve the benefit of the entire supply chain system in comparison with fixing lead time.Our proposed coordination mechanisms can improve the management of supply chain costs in both symmetric and asymmetric information situations.