CAJ | 학술논문

设计合理的激励机制能有效防范基金市场道德风险的发生，在信息不列称条件下，构建了存在老鼠仓行为的委托代理模型，通过对模型的理论分析，表明老鼠仓行为的存在会降低基金经理努力水平及其承担风险的意愿，从而损害基金投资者的利益。存此基础上，引入声誉激励机制，发现声誉激励机制能提高基金经理增加基金收益的努力水甲，增加基余经理承担风险的意愿，保护基金投资者的利益。
설계합리적격려궤제능유효방범기금시장도덕풍험적발생，재신식불렬칭조건하，구건료존재로서창행위적위탁대리모형，통과대모형적이론분석，표명로서창행위적존재회강저기금경리노력수평급기승담풍험적의원，종이손해기금투자자적이익。존차기출상，인입성예격려궤제，발현성예격려궤제능제고기금경리증가기금수익적노력수갑，증가기여경리승담풍험적의원，보호기금투자자적이익。
The rationally designed incentive mechanism can prevent the moral hazard in the fund market. Under asymmetric information, this paper suggests constructing the principal-agent model in the case of the rat trading, and proposes that the rat trading could reduce the efforts and the level of risk selection of the fund manager, for which would be injurious to the fund investors＇ interests. Based on the researches above, this paper introduces the reputation incentive mechanism to the model and concludes that the reputation mechanism directly and indirectly increases the efforts and the will of avoiding risk of the fund manager, which can protect the interests of the fund investors.