CAJ | 학술논문

薪酬管制是我国市场低效率和政府作为国有企业经营者的特殊身份下的现实选择，而市场低效率集中体现在投资者非理性，薪酬管制给经理人通过迎合投资者情绪获取私人收益创造了客观条件。本文基于迎合效应的薪酬结构模型分析，将在职消费纳入薪酬契约中，探讨薪酬管制前后怎样的薪酬结构会致使国有企业经理人为了自身利益最大化而做出迎合投资者情绪的投资决策。研究表明，薪酬管制并没有如现有文献所诟病的那样降低了经理人的激励效率，在制度创新尚未成熟前，在职消费与限制性股票的契约组合反而成为经理人自我激励的方法。这说明在低效率市场中薪酬管制有其合理性。
신수관제시아국시장저효솔화정부작위국유기업경영자적특수신빈하적현실선택，이시장저효솔집중체현재투자자비이성，신수관제급경리인통과영합투자자정서획취사인수익창조료객관조건。본문기우영합효응적신수결구모형분석，장재직소비납입신수계약중，탐토신수관제전후즘양적신수결구회치사국유기업경리인위료자신이익최대화이주출영합투자자정서적투자결책。연구표명，신수관제병몰유여현유문헌소후병적나양강저료경리인적격려효솔，재제도창신상미성숙전，재직소비여한제성고표적계약조합반이성위경리인자아격려적방법。저설명재저효솔시장중신수관제유기합이성。
Wage restraint is a practical choice against the background of lower economic efficiency and the government as state-owned enterprise operator. Low economic efficiency mainly reflected in investor＇ s irrationality. Wage Restraint created a condition for manager to cater to investor sentiment. In this paper, we analyze the model of Pay-structure based on the catering theory and take non-pecuniary compensation into account. Comparing the efficiency before and after wage restraint, we discuss what kind of salary structure would lead managers of state-owned enterprises to cater to investor sentiment in order to maximize their own interests. The study found that wage restraint does not reduce the manager＇ s incentive efficiency. The combinations of non-pecuniary compensation and restricted stock can become a self-motivated approach before the system innovation is not yet mature.