软科学
軟科學
연과학
Soft Science
2011年
6期
36~39
,共null页
非对称信息 农地流转 规模经营者 激励与监督
非對稱信息 農地流轉 規模經營者 激勵與鑑督
비대칭신식 농지류전 규모경영자 격려여감독
asymmetric information; agricultural land transfer; scale operator; incentive and supervision
运用信息经济学的相关理论，构建了关于我国农地规模经营者的激励与监督机制的定性分析框架和定量决策模型。通过在信息不对称条件下的模型均衡结果的分析，刻画了报酬契约最优激励因子的影响因素及变化规律、激励强度与监督成本的耦合机理及其对农地规模经营者经济行为的影响，并得出了一系列有益的技术性结论。
運用信息經濟學的相關理論，構建瞭關于我國農地規模經營者的激勵與鑑督機製的定性分析框架和定量決策模型。通過在信息不對稱條件下的模型均衡結果的分析，刻畫瞭報酬契約最優激勵因子的影響因素及變化規律、激勵彊度與鑑督成本的耦閤機理及其對農地規模經營者經濟行為的影響，併得齣瞭一繫列有益的技術性結論。
운용신식경제학적상관이론，구건료관우아국농지규모경영자적격려여감독궤제적정성분석광가화정량결책모형。통과재신식불대칭조건하적모형균형결과적분석，각화료보수계약최우격려인자적영향인소급변화규률、격려강도여감독성본적우합궤리급기대농지규모경영자경제행위적영향，병득출료일계렬유익적기술성결론。
In view of the theory about information economics, the analysis framework＇and decision model about scale operator＇s incentives and supervision mechanism from rural land transfer project are constructed. By analyzing the equilibrium results of model under asymmetric information, the factors and variations affecting the contract＇s optimal incentive co- efficient, coupling mechanism between incentive coefficient and supervision cost, and their influences on agent＇s behavior are portrayed. Moreover, a series of useful technical conclusions are obtained.
