财经研究
財經研究
재경연구
The Study of Finance and Economics
2011年
12期
39~49
,共null页
政府干预 财务困境 管理者自利 treatment effect模型
政府榦預 財務睏境 管理者自利 treatment effect模型
정부간예 재무곤경 관리자자리 treatment effect모형
government intervention; financial dilemma; management self-interest; treatment effect model
文章运用处理效应(treatment effect)模型,从财务困境视角研究了政府干预对管理者自利行为的影响。研究发现,当政府干预程度较低时,相对于未发生财务困境的公司,困境公司管理者的自利行为会有所减弱;但当政府干预程度增强时,困境公司管理者自利行为减弱的程度将趋缓。对于政府控制的公司,当金融机构信贷决策受到政府干预的影响较弱时,财务困境期间管理者自利行为会有所减弱;随着政府对金融机构信贷决策干预程度的加强,困境公司管理者自利行为趋于严重。对于非政府控制的公司,困境期间管理者自利行为对金融机构信贷决策的自主性并不敏感。
文章運用處理效應(treatment effect)模型,從財務睏境視角研究瞭政府榦預對管理者自利行為的影響。研究髮現,噹政府榦預程度較低時,相對于未髮生財務睏境的公司,睏境公司管理者的自利行為會有所減弱;但噹政府榦預程度增彊時,睏境公司管理者自利行為減弱的程度將趨緩。對于政府控製的公司,噹金融機構信貸決策受到政府榦預的影響較弱時,財務睏境期間管理者自利行為會有所減弱;隨著政府對金融機構信貸決策榦預程度的加彊,睏境公司管理者自利行為趨于嚴重。對于非政府控製的公司,睏境期間管理者自利行為對金融機構信貸決策的自主性併不敏感。
문장운용처리효응(treatment effect)모형,종재무곤경시각연구료정부간예대관리자자리행위적영향。연구발현,당정부간예정도교저시,상대우미발생재무곤경적공사,곤경공사관리자적자리행위회유소감약;단당정부간예정도증강시,곤경공사관리자자리행위감약적정도장추완。대우정부공제적공사,당금융궤구신대결책수도정부간예적영향교약시,재무곤경기간관리자자리행위회유소감약;수착정부대금융궤구신대결책간예정도적가강,곤경공사관리자자리행위추우엄중。대우비정부공제적공사,곤경기간관리자자리행위대금융궤구신대결책적자주성병불민감。
This paper employs the treatment effect model to investigate the effect of government intervention on management self-interest behavior from the angle of financial dilemma.The results indicate that under low level of government intervention,management self-interest behavior in companies with financial dilemma is weakening compared to companies without financial dilemma;the stronger the level of government intervention is,the smaller the weakening level of management self-interest behavior is.As for government-controlled companies,management self-interest behavior in companies with financial dilemma is weakening when government intervention weakly affect the credit decision-making of financial institutions;as the government intervention on the credit decision-making of financial institutions strengthens,the management self-interest behavior in companies with financial dilemma becomes more serious.In non-government controlled companies,the management self-interest behavior in companies with financial dilemma is not sensitive to financial institutions' autonomy in credit decision-making.