东北大学学报：社会科学版
東北大學學報：社會科學版
동북대학학보：사회과학판
Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
2011年
6期
499~505
,共null页
显性报酬 控制权收益 高管薪酬 在职消费
顯性報酬 控製權收益 高管薪酬 在職消費
현성보수 공제권수익 고관신수 재직소비
explicit reward; control benefit; top managers＇ reward; perquisite consumption
通过何种方式抑制企业高管特别是国企高管的过度在职消费等控制权收益,是我国经济转轨时期改革的难点问题。根据高管收益替代的理论分析,基于中国企业高管薪酬逐年上升的事实,采用Driscoll-Kraay标准误差的固定效应回归模型,以2003—2009年755家中国上市公司的面板数据为样本进行实证研究,研究发现：从整体上看随着中国企业高管显性报酬的提高,高管显性报酬对高管控制权收益具有显著的替代效应,显性化效果显著;然而,由于存在着监督力的差异,国企高管控制权收益的显性化效果弱于非国企,因此显性化改革过程中监督力的强化不可或缺。
通過何種方式抑製企業高管特彆是國企高管的過度在職消費等控製權收益,是我國經濟轉軌時期改革的難點問題。根據高管收益替代的理論分析,基于中國企業高管薪酬逐年上升的事實,採用Driscoll-Kraay標準誤差的固定效應迴歸模型,以2003—2009年755傢中國上市公司的麵闆數據為樣本進行實證研究,研究髮現：從整體上看隨著中國企業高管顯性報酬的提高,高管顯性報酬對高管控製權收益具有顯著的替代效應,顯性化效果顯著;然而,由于存在著鑑督力的差異,國企高管控製權收益的顯性化效果弱于非國企,因此顯性化改革過程中鑑督力的彊化不可或缺。
통과하충방식억제기업고관특별시국기고관적과도재직소비등공제권수익,시아국경제전궤시기개혁적난점문제。근거고관수익체대적이론분석,기우중국기업고관신수축년상승적사실,채용Driscoll-Kraay표준오차적고정효응회귀모형,이2003—2009년755가중국상시공사적면판수거위양본진행실증연구,연구발현：종정체상간수착중국기업고관현성보수적제고,고관현성보수대고관공제권수익구유현저적체대효응,현성화효과현저;연이,유우존재착감독력적차이,국기고관공제권수익적현성화효과약우비국기,인차현성화개혁과정중감독력적강화불가혹결。
One of the thorny problems during the period of economic transition is how to restrict such control benefits as excessive perquisite consumption,especially in the state-owned enterprises.Based on the substitution theory of top manager＇s benefits and in view of the fact that top manager＇s salaries increase year by year in China,this paper uses Driscoll-Kraay＇s fixed effect regression model of standard error and the panel data from 755 listed companies during 2003—2009 for an empirical study.The results indicate while the explicit reward of top managers is on the rise,it has a significant substitution effect on control benefits,i.e.,the explicitation effect is significant;however,due to the differences in supervision,the explicitation effect of top managers in state-owned enterprises is weaker than that in non-state-owned enterprises.It can be safely concluded,then,that it is indispensable to reinforce supervision in the process of explicitation reform.
