CAJ | 학술논문

本文以中国上市公司为样本，研究政府控制、政府干预对财务困境公司管理者自利行为的影响。研究发现，政府干预程度较低的地区，发生财务困境时管理者明显节制了自身的自利行为；但在政府干预较严重的地区，财务困境公司在职消费的倾向加重。在非政府控制的公司中，发生财务困境时管理者没有收敛其自利行为；与之相比，政府为实际控制人的财务困境公司在职消费与超常薪酬显著降低。上述结果表明，制度环境层面上的政府干预干扰了公司外部治理机制，从而加重了困境公司管理者代理问题，而在政府控制的困境公司，管理者则面临着较强的制度规范和行政约束。
본문이중국상시공사위양본，연구정부공제、정부간예대재무곤경공사관리자자리행위적영향。연구발현，정부간예정도교저적지구，발생재무곤경시관리자명현절제료자신적자리행위；단재정부간예교엄중적지구，재무곤경공사재직소비적경향가중。재비정부공제적공사중，발생재무곤경시관리자몰유수렴기자리행위；여지상비，정부위실제공제인적재무곤경공사재직소비여초상신수현저강저。상술결과표명，제도배경층면상적정부간예간우료공사외부치리궤제，종이가중료곤경공사관리자대리문제，이재정부공제적곤경공사，관리자칙면림착교강적제도규범화행정약속。
Using Chinese listed companies as the sample, this paper explores the influence of government control, government intervention on the managerial self-interested behaviors in the context of financial distress. The results indicate that under the condition of financial distress, in the districts where government intervention is weaker, managers tend to control their self-interested behaviors. However, in the districts where government intervention is severer, the perk of financially distressed companies is higher. During the financial distress, management of non-government controlled companies does not restrain their self-interested behaviors, while in government controlled companies the amounts of perk and extra compensation are mitigated significantly. The paper indicates government intervention at the institutional level aggravate the managerial agency problem of distressed companies, while managers in government-controlled companies are regulated by stronger administrative constraint.