CAJ | 학술논문

以N条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的单链式供应链为研究对象，分别讨论了多供应链间Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈问题，对Ⅳ条供应链间博弈均衡解进行了分析和求解，证明了Ⅳ条供应链博弈下均衡解的存在性和唯一性。在实例分析中，以两条供应链为例，比较了不同博弈框架下定价策略和系统利润的差异。结果表明，对于供应链1来说，链间Nash博弈时的零售商利润、制造商利润和供应链利润均大于链间Stackelberg博弈情形，也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度，他们均乐于放弃作为领导者的先动优势；对于供应链2来说，情况则相反，也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度，他们均乐于作为追随者发挥后动优势。
이N조포함일개제조상화일개령수상적단련식공응련위연구대상，분별토론료다공응련간Nash박혁화Stackelberg박혁문제，대Ⅳ조공응련간박혁균형해진행료분석화구해，증명료Ⅳ조공응련박혁하균형해적존재성화유일성。재실례분석중，이량조공응련위례，비교료불동박혁광가하정개책략화계통리윤적차이。결과표명，대우공응련1래설，련간Nash박혁시적령수상리윤、제조상리윤화공응련리윤균대우련간Stackelberg박혁정형，야즉무론종령수상、제조상환시정조공응련적각도，타문균악우방기작위령도자적선동우세；대우공응련2래설，정황칙상반，야즉무론종령수상、제조상환시정조공응련적각도，타문균악우작위추수자발휘후동우세。
In this paper, the competition issue among multiple supply chains is addressed. The supply chain considered is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Both Nash and Stackelberg game models are developed for the problem. It is shown that there is a unique equilibrium for both models. For the two-supply-chain scenario, the system profit obtained under different pricing strategy is compared between these two game models. It is found that, for supply chain 1, the profit of retailer, manufacturer, and the whole supply chain obtained under the Nash game is greater than that obtained under the Stackelberg game. This implies that anyone of the retailer, manufacturer, and the whole supply chain is willing to give up the first-mover advantage as a leader. However, in contrast to supply chain 1, for supply chain 2, anyone of the retailer, manufacturer, and the whole supply chain want to act as the follower and exert the late-mover advantage.