CAJ | 학술논문

假定企业生产与管理系统运作可靠性这一内部因素已经被量化，在此基础上描述了非对称信息条件下企业经营者的激励模型。通过对模型最优解的分析以及非对称信息问题的贝叶斯分析，讨论了观测力度对企业经营者努力水平、激励水平、风险成本和代理成本等的影响。研究结论表明，观测带来了自然状态方差的下降；随着委托者观测力度的增加，经营者减少了消极怠工的机会，同时得到了更高水平的激励；除去观测成本这一因素，委托人对企业经营者的观测节约了总的代理成本。
가정기업생산여관리계통운작가고성저일내부인소이경피양화，재차기출상묘술료비대칭신식조건하기업경영자적격려모형。통과대모형최우해적분석이급비대칭신식문제적패협사분석，토론료관측력도대기업경영자노력수평、격려수평、풍험성본화대리성본등적영향。연구결론표명，관측대래료자연상태방차적하강；수착위탁자관측력도적증가，경영자감소료소겁태공적궤회，동시득도료경고수평적격려；제거관측성본저일인소，위탁인대기업경영자적관측절약료총적대리성본。
The incentive mechanism is discussed for the principal-agent environment. It is assumed that the reliability of the production and management systems in an enterprise is a general information system and the correlative reliability indexes are quantified. A mathematical model is developed to describe the incentive mechanism with the influence of uncertainty factor and information asymmetry taken into account. This model describes the relation between the effectiveness and the observation levels. Based on this model, by using Baysian theory under the asymmetrical information, analysis is carried out to show the effect of different observation level on agent＇s effort, risky cost, incentive sharing rate and agency cost, etc. Results show that high level observation can promote the incentive and reduce the cost.