CAJ | 학술논문

针对建设项目特殊性三角结构关系，应用演化博弈理论对其跨组织创新应用合作的演化稳定策略进行了分析。以有限理性为假设前提，构建了施工：疗及设计方进行创新应用合作的复制动态模型，分析了合作协同系数、收益溢出系数、合作收益大小及其分配机制、合作成本大小及其分配机制等因素对双方演化稳定策略的影响；探讨了业主方补贴情形下设计方及施工方进行创新应用合作的策略选择及其稳定性，分析了业主方补贴策略的有效性及局限性。
침대건설항목특수성삼각결구관계，응용연화박혁이론대기과조직창신응용합작적연화은정책략진행료분석。이유한이성위가설전제，구건료시공：료급설계방진행창신응용합작적복제동태모형，분석료합작협동계수、수익일출계수、합작수익대소급기분배궤제、합작성본대소급기분배궤제등인소대쌍방연화은정책략적영향；탐토료업주방보첩정형하설계방급시공방진행창신응용합작적책략선택급기은정성，분석료업주방보첩책략적유효성급국한성。
Considering the special triangular relationship structure in the construction project, this paper uses the evolutionary game theory to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategies （ESS） for the cooperative implementation of inter-or- ganizational innovation in a project. Based on the assumption of participants＇ bounded rationality, this paper firstly con- structs a replicator dynamics model for the contractor and designer＇ s cooperation of inter-organizational innovation implementation and analyzes the influences of cooperation coordination coefficient, benefit spillover coefficient, cooperation benefit value, benefit allocation coefficient, cooperation cost value and cost allocation coefficient on the evolution and stability of participants＇ strategies. Then it discusses how the project owner could use the subsidy policy to influence the contractor and designer＇ s evolutionarily stable strategies for their cooperative implementation of inter-organizational innovation, and especially analyzes the validity and limitation of the subsidy policy.