CAJ | 학술논문

文章针对评标权力寻租问题，借鉴权力运作理论作为理论依据，将评标委员会成员的权力配置、授予和运行引发的利益冲突作为分析线索，阐明评标权力寻租行为发生的内在逻辑以及相关影响因素。沿着权力运作理论与寻租理论这两条主线为构建防范评标中的权力寻租体系提出构想，建立相应权力制约机制；权力配置时构建报酬机制和监督机制；权力授予时建立规范的评标人员制度；权力运行时提高程序运行的透明度。
문장침대평표권력심조문제，차감권력운작이론작위이론의거，장평표위원회성원적권력배치、수여화운행인발적이익충돌작위분석선색，천명평표권력심조행위발생적내재라집이급상관영향인소。연착권력운작이론여심조이론저량조주선위구건방범평표중적권력심조체계제출구상，건립상응권력제약궤제；권력배치시구건보수궤제화감독궤제；권력수여시건립규범적평표인원제도；권력운행시제고정서운행적투명도。
This paper focuses on the rent-seeking problems in the bidding evaluation institution. Based on the power operation theory, it analyzes the power allocation, award and interest conflict which is triggered by operation. It demonstrates the interhal logic and related factors of rent-seeking in bidding process. Through power operation theory and rent theory＇, this paper con- structs a system to avoid rent-seeking in bidding process, and establishes a serial of power restrict mechanism, including building an reward mechanism and supervision mechanism in the bidding power distribution, establishing a standardized bid assessment of personnel system in the bidding power allocation, improving the procedural transparency in the power operation.