攀登：哲学社会科学版
攀登：哲學社會科學版
반등：철학사회과학판
Ascent
2011年
6期
102~106
,共null页
农地征用 利益博弈 博弈均衡 立法选择
農地徵用 利益博弈 博弈均衡 立法選擇
농지정용 이익박혁 박혁균형 입법선택
Farmland acquisition; interest competition; competition equality; legislation option
当前农地征用中失地农民与地方政府之间存在明显的利益分歧,利益博弈各方时常处于零和的状态。某些土地制度规定的相对滞后和地方政府行为的错位及＂官本位＂格局下强政府——弱农民的力量对比态势,成为利益零和博弈的根本原因。明晰农地产权主体,重构农地产权制度,创建一个有效而公平的谈判协商机制,创建农民组织,规范政府行为,这些都是立法选择方面的主要构想。
噹前農地徵用中失地農民與地方政府之間存在明顯的利益分歧,利益博弈各方時常處于零和的狀態。某些土地製度規定的相對滯後和地方政府行為的錯位及＂官本位＂格跼下彊政府——弱農民的力量對比態勢,成為利益零和博弈的根本原因。明晰農地產權主體,重構農地產權製度,創建一箇有效而公平的談判協商機製,創建農民組織,規範政府行為,這些都是立法選擇方麵的主要構想。
당전농지정용중실지농민여지방정부지간존재명현적이익분기,이익박혁각방시상처우령화적상태。모사토지제도규정적상대체후화지방정부행위적착위급＂관본위＂격국하강정부——약농민적역량대비태세,성위이익령화박혁적근본원인。명석농지산권주체,중구농지산권제도,창건일개유효이공평적담판협상궤제,창건농민조직,규범정부행위,저사도시입법선택방면적주요구상。
Currently,there are obvious interest disparity between lost land farmers and local government in the farmland acquisition,and the all sides of interest competition are in a status of zero harmony.The basic cause of it is that some land systematic regulations relatively backward and local governmental administration being in dislocation,and the strength of powerful government and feeble farmers under the phase of ＂official position＂ being in comparison.Clarifying the main body of farmland property rights,rebuild statutes of it,and reconstruct an efficient and fare negotiation mechanism,farmer organizations,and standardize governmental behavior,all these are main ideas of legislation option.
