CAJ | 학술논문

针对专利联盟在累进创新条件下对企业研发的影响，构建一个描述企业研发强度随已产生专利数量变动的动态博弈模型。在比较无联盟和有联盟两种情况下的专利竞争模型和马尔可夫完美均衡模式的基础上，得出联盟对企业各阶段均衡研发强度的影响，并进一步分析许可费和联盟规模对创新效应的影响。结果表明，联盟的存在解决了专利丛林问题．在联盟形成前各企业均衡投资水平逐渐提高，并在联盟形成后企业保持稳定的研发投资动机；许可费越高（低）被许可企业的均衡研发强度水平越低（高），且联盟存在一个最优许可费，使成员专利价值和研发强度达到最大化；规模较大的联盟对潜在成员的研发激励效果更持久，规模较小的联盟激励效果更强。
침대전리련맹재루진창신조건하대기업연발적영향，구건일개묘술기업연발강도수이산생전리수량변동적동태박혁모형。재비교무련맹화유련맹량충정황하적전리경쟁모형화마이가부완미균형모식적기출상，득출련맹대기업각계단균형연발강도적영향，병진일보분석허가비화련맹규모대창신효응적영향。결과표명，련맹적존재해결료전리총림문제．재련맹형성전각기업균형투자수평축점제고，병재련맹형성후기업보지은정적연발투자동궤；허가비월고（저）피허가기업적균형연발강도수평월저（고），차련맹존재일개최우허가비，사성원전리개치화연발강도체도최대화；규모교대적련맹대잠재성원적연발격려효과경지구，규모교소적련맹격려효과경강。
Aiming at effect of patent pools to firms＇ R＆D investment under cumulative innovation condition, we constructed a dynamic game model in which R＆D investment by firms change with the number of existing patent. By comparing the Markov perfect equilibrium patterns with and without pool, this paper obtained the effect of pool to the R＆D investment equilibrium of different stages, and analyzed the effect of licensing fee and pool scale. The result shows that the existing of pool resolved the patent thicket problem, gradually improved firms＇ R＆D equilibrium before pool coalition, and maintains the stability of firms＇ R＆D investment motives after pool coalition. The higher （lower） of the licensing fee was the lower （higher） of the firms＇ R＆D equilibrium was, and there was an optimal fee level, which maximized the value of patents owned by pool members and firms＇ R＆D investment. Pools of larger size encouraged potential members＇ R＆D incentive more abiding, and pools of smaller size encouraged potential members＇ R＆D incentive stronger.