CAJ | 학술논문

本文以2006～2009年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本，在根据投资目标对机构投资者进行类型划分的基础上，探讨了机构投资者独立性对代理成本的影响。研究发现，独立机构持股比例越高，公司管理层代理成本和控股股东代理成本越低，而非独立机构持股对两类代理成本影响有限。在进一步考虑了控股股东持股比例的影响后，发现独立机构持股在控股股东偏好控制权私有收益的情况下更能降低管理层代理成本，表明在此情况下，独立机构对管理层自利行为有更大的监督作用。
본문이2006～2009년호심량시A고상시공사위양본，재근거투자목표대궤구투자자진행류형화분적기출상，탐토료궤구투자자독립성대대리성본적영향。연구발현，독립궤구지고비례월고，공사관리층대리성본화공고고동대리성본월저，이비독립궤구지고대량류대리성본영향유한。재진일보고필료공고고동지고비례적영향후，발현독립궤구지고재공고고동편호공제권사유수익적정황하경능강저관리층대리성본，표명재차정황하，독립궤구대관리층자리행위유경대적감독작용。
Using 2006-2009 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples, we classify the different types of institutional investors according to their investment objectives and study the impact of institutional investors independence on the agency cost. The results indicate that the higher holding of independent institutions, the lower management agency cost and controlling shareholder agency cost, and the impact of dependent institutions on agency cost is limited. After considering the controlling shareholders＇ impact, we find that when controlling shareholders prefer private gains, independent institutions can further reduce management agency cost, indicating a greater supervisory role of independent institutions on the management self-interested behavior under this condition.