CAJ | 학술논문

以我国沪深两市2004—2006年上市公司的经验数据为样本，在国有企业和国有商业银行双重软预算约束的框架内，实证检验了银行负债的过度投资控制功能。研究发现，银行负债的过度投资控制功能整体上是失效的，这种失效对于政府控制的公司是恶化的，对于非政府控制的公司则是弱化的。若深入到银行负债的具体构成，研究显示，短期借款的过度投资控制功能在政府控制的公司中是弱化的，在非政府控制的公司中则是有效的；而长期借款的过度投资控制功能在政府控制的公司中是恶化的，在非政府控制的公司中则是弱化的，并且，随着第一大股东持股比例的增加，长期借款的过度投资控制功能失效问题在省级政府和非政府控制的公司中变得越严重。相反，对于第一大股东持股比例较低的省级政府和非政府控制的公司，长期借款的过度投资控制功能则分别是有效的和弱化的。上述结果说明，在我国双重软预算约束产生的制度性根源未得到根本改善的前提下，银行负债的软预算约束问题及由此导致的过度投资控制功能失效问题并不必然随着国有企业产权改革而自动消除。
이아국호심량시2004—2006년상시공사적경험수거위양본，재국유기업화국유상업은행쌍중연예산약속적광가내，실증검험료은행부채적과도투자공제공능。연구발현，은행부채적과도투자공제공능정체상시실효적，저충실효대우정부공제적공사시악화적，대우비정부공제적공사칙시약화적。약심입도은행부채적구체구성，연구현시，단기차관적과도투자공제공능재정부공제적공사중시약화적，재비정부공제적공사중칙시유효적；이장기차관적과도투자공제공능재정부공제적공사중시악화적，재비정부공제적공사중칙시약화적，병차，수착제일대고동지고비례적증가，장기차관적과도투자공제공능실효문제재성급정부화비정부공제적공사중변득월엄중。상반，대우제일대고동지고비례교저적성급정부화비정부공제적공사，장기차관적과도투자공제공능칙분별시유효적화약화적。상술결과설명，재아국쌍중연예산약속산생적제도성근원미득도근본개선적전제하，은행부채적연예산약속문제급유차도치적과도투자공제공능실효문제병불필연수착국유기업산권개혁이자동소제。
Based on the fundamental theory of soft budget constraints on stated-owned commercial banks and stated-owned enterprises, using 3480 observations of the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2004-2006, this paper empirically study on control function on overinvestment of bank debts. The results show that the control function on overinvestment of bank debts is inefficient on the whole, which is worsen with regard to state-owned enterprise and weaken towards non-state-owned enterprise. Furthermore, the control function on overinvestment of short-term debts is weaken in state-owned enterprise, but works well in non-state-owned enterprise, while the control function on overinvestment of longterm debts is worsen in state-owned enterprise and weaken in non-state-owned enterprise. What＇s more, as the ownership ratio of the fi~t large shareholder rising, the inefficience of control function on overinvestment of long-term debts is more critical in provincial governments-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. On the contrary, with regard to the provincial governments-owned and non-state-owned enterprises with lower ownership ratio of first large shareholder, control function on overinvestment of long-term debts is effective and weaken respectively. The findings above mean that before the institutional reasons is not systematically improved, the soft budget constraint of bank debts and the resulting failure of control function on overinvestment may not disappear automatically with reform of property rights of SOEs.