CAJ | 학술논문

本文运用数值例子和一般化博弈模型对1个生产商、1个大零售商和／n／个小零售商的市场进行了考察，给出了大零售商对生产商拥有讨价还价力量、生产商对小零售商拥有讨价还价力量时的市场均衡。结论为：（1）在大零售商使用包含通道费在内的“三部费”合约的市场均衡中，上下游可以实现纵向一体化利润。与生产商对下游完全拥有市场力量的情形相比，消费者剩余不会降低，市场价格不会上升，生产商获得的利润也不会减少。（2）大零售商的利润来自于消除上下游市场外部性，以及对市场效率改进的边际贡献。通道费可以视作是大零售商通过挖掘市场效率而获利的一种机制设计。（3）从政策角度看，用单一禁止通道费来提高市场效率和社会福利的目标往往难以实现。与其简单地取消进场费，还不如把政策的着力点放在支持小零售商、改善零售市场结构效率上。
본문운용수치례자화일반화박혁모형대1개생산상、1개대령수상화／n／개소령수상적시장진행료고찰，급출료대령수상대생산상옹유토개환개역량、생산상대소령수상옹유토개환개역량시적시장균형。결론위：（1）재대령수상사용포함통도비재내적“삼부비”합약적시장균형중，상하유가이실현종향일체화리윤。여생산상대하유완전옹유시장역량적정형상비，소비자잉여불회강저，시장개격불회상승，생산상획득적리윤야불회감소。（2）대령수상적리윤래자우소제상하유시장외부성，이급대시장효솔개진적변제공헌。통도비가이시작시대령수상통과알굴시장효솔이획리적일충궤제설계。（3）종정책각도간，용단일금지통도비래제고시장효솔화사회복리적목표왕왕난이실현。여기간단지취소진장비，환불여파정책적착력점방재지지소령수상、개선령수시장결구효솔상。
The paper studies the market structure with one manufacture, one dominant retailerand n competitive fringe retailers. In the model, the dominant retailer has bargaining power toward the manufacture, and the manufacture has bargaining power toward the fringe retailers. The paper shows that. 1） the dominant retailer can use the three-part tariff contract including slotting allowance to fulfill the industry＇s vertical integrated profit. Compared with the situation when the manufacture has complete market power toward retailers, manufacture＇s profit and consumer surplus will not decrease, the market price will not increase; 2） the profit of the dominant comes from the contribution to enhancing the market efficiency; 3） if slotting allowance was forbidden,there would not only be efficiency loss, but also small retailers might beexcluded.