CAJ | 학술논문

以往的文献很少关注募资变更之后的投向，从而使得募资变更如何导致公司价值下降成为“黑箱”。本文选取2000—2008年地方国有上市公司为样本，从政府干预下募资变更后投向的角度解开部分“黑箱”。我们从晋升激励、财政激励和社会稳定等方面构建政府多重目标的干预指数，发现政府干预越强，募资变更几率越大；政府干预下公司募资变更后更易投向固定投资，最终降低公司价值。进一步发现，固定投资的资金是否来自募资变更并不能影响公司价值，降低公司价值的关键原因在于政府干预；政府干预之下公司进行的募资变更和固定投资均降低了公司价值，而募资变更是政府干预下公司进行固定投资的主要途径之一。本文从募资变更投向角度揭示了政府对企业“掠夺之手”的具体路径，有助于加深我们对政府干预企业的认识。
이왕적문헌흔소관주모자변경지후적투향，종이사득모자변경여하도치공사개치하강성위“흑상”。본문선취2000—2008년지방국유상시공사위양본，종정부간예하모자변경후투향적각도해개부분“흑상”。아문종진승격려、재정격려화사회은정등방면구건정부다중목표적간예지수，발현정부간예월강，모자변경궤솔월대；정부간예하공사모자변경후경역투향고정투자，최종강저공사개치。진일보발현，고정투자적자금시부래자모자변경병불능영향공사개치，강저공사개치적관건원인재우정부간예；정부간예지하공사진행적모자변경화고정투자균강저료공사개치，이모자변경시정부간예하공사진행고정투자적주요도경지일。본문종모자변경투향각도게시료정부대기업“략탈지수”적구체로경，유조우가심아문대정부간예기업적인식。
Raising money through stock issuance is an important capital source of listed companies＇ invest- ments. However, many companies＇ investments are not according to the commitment in the stock issue prospectus. Although considerable literatures found that the changes ofcommitted investment orientation can cause the reduction of companies＇ value, the researchers have paid little attention to the investments after the orientation changes, which turns the pathway of committed investment orientation＇s changes reducing companies＇ value into a ＂black box＂. By observing the data of local state-owned listed companies from the year 2000 to 2008, this paper tries to part- ly unlock the ＂black box＂ from the perspective of investment after the changes of committed investment orientation. Local governments concern about the officials＇ promotion, fiscal revenue and social stability. So, local govern- ments tend to intervene in the enterprises under the above incentives. And the local state-owned enterprises, due to their majority of the shares belonged to local governments and the managers directly appointedby the local govern- ments, are the focus of government intervention. We build a local government intervention index of multi-targets, which consists of moving average GDP growth, fiscal revenue, unemployment rate, and find that when government intervention is strong, the probability of investment orientation changes will increase. Evidence shows that local state-owned enterprises will add fixed assets investment after the investment orienta- tion changes under the government intervention. This is because that fixed assets investment will meet the multi-tar- gets of local government. Firstly, as the main driving force of the economic growth in China, fixed assets investment can increase the promotion probability of the officials. Secondly, the fixed assets investment will get more tax base which canincrease the fiscal revenue. Thirdly, the fixed assets investment will increase the employment. From the evidences, we also find the company＇s committed investment orientation changes and fixed assets in- vestments under the government interventionboth reduce the companies＇ value. Enterprise＇s target is value-maximi- zing, which is different with the government＇s multi-targets. Government intervention could have some ＂political costs＂, which depends on the degree of objectives conflicts between government and firm. We are cautious about those above conclusions and do further analyze. The investment orientation changes re- ducing the company＇ value may be because the enterprises add fixed assets investment after the investment orienta- tion changes. But we find this possible reason is not significant as the government intervention in the effects the val- ue of the company. The enterprise adding fixed assets investment after its investment orientation changes does not affect the value of the company. But, the company＇s value will reduce if the increased fixed assets after the invest- ment orientation changes are under the government intervention. The investment orientation change is the main way to add the fixed assets investment, which will meet the multi-targets of local governments. This paper partly reveals how the local government takes the ＂grabbing hand＂ to the local state-owned compa- nies from the angle of the investment after the changes of committed investment orientation, which helps us to deep- ly understand the corporate behavior under government intervention, and enriches the researchabout the ＂grabbing hand＂. Finally, we propose following two suggestions about how to limit the damage of local state-owned companies under the ＂grabbing hand＂： on the one hand, the government appraisal system should be improved; on the other hand, the local government decrease the control of the investment decision-making authority of local state-owned companies.